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AKE v. OKLAHOMA AND AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT'S
'RIGHT' TO AN EXPERT WITNESS: A PROMISE
DENIED OR IMAGINED?
Carlton Bailey*
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, it has attempted to
determine and clarify the rights of an indigent defendant. Over the past sixteen
years, many questions concerning an indigent defendant's access to expert
witnesses have been answered, but many questions still remain. In this article,
Professor Carlton Bailey attempts to clarify the Ake decision by arguing that an
indigent defendant should be able to secure, upon a proper showing, psychiatric
and non-psychiatric assistance at state expense.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution guarantees an indigent defendant the right to
a fair trial.' To ensure that he receives a fair trial, the United States Supreme Court
has held that an indigent defendant is entitled, at government expense, to certain
basic tools.2 Pursuant to this tradition, Ake v. Oklahoma3 held that an indigent
defendant has a right to an expert psychiatrist for his defense. Regrettably, an
indigent's use of such expert assistance has been severely compromised by the
Court's failure to clarify Ake,4 and by the lower federal courts' inability to agree on
its purpose.' A fair reading of Ake would clarify its scope and reveal its purpose.
This article attempts to begin that process.
Glenn Burton Ake was arrested and charged with two "brutal" murders.6
Because of his bizarre behavior during the arraignment, the trial judge ordered that
he be examined by a psychiatrist! As a result of that examination, Ake was
committed to the state hospital for further observation Initially, the state forensic
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville,
Arkansas.
'Griffm v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) ("There can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.").
2 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (finding the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel for an indigent defendant was fully incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (finding the due process right of an indigent
defendant to the assistance of court-appointed counsel).
3 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
4 See infra notes 122-88 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 189-393 and accompanying text.
6 See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
7 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
s See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
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psychiatrist determined that Ake was not competent to stand trial.9 Six weeks later,
however, Ake was found to be competent.' 0
Ake's attorney requested the assistance of a psychiatrist, at government
expense, to help present an insanity defense." The trial judge rejected this
request. Following his trial, Ake was convicted and sentenced to death. 3
In 1985, Ake's death sentence was vacated by the United States Supreme
Court.' 4 Ake argued that the trial court erred in not providing a court-appointed
psychiatrist to help him prepare and present an insanity defense.' 5 Justice Thurgood
Marshall, writing for the majority, agreed with Ake's position. Justice Marshall
held that as an indigent defendant, Ake had been denied due process because the
trial judge failed to provide him with a "basic tool[]" necessary for an effective
defense.'6 Accordingly, Ake was granted a new trial'" and spared the death
penalty. 8
Ake appeared to expand on Griffin v. Illinois,9 which held that it was a denial
of equal protection for a state to condition a right to appeal on a citizen's ability to
pay for a trial transcript."0 Ake's promise of expert assistance for the indigent has
been deemed by some commentators as not only indicative of Justice Marshall's
compassion and fair-mindedness, but as a substantial advancement in the law.' It
9 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
'4 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985). In the same year, the Court vacated the
death sentence of a Mississippi inmate, Bobby Caldwell. Caldwell alleged that his request
for non-psychiatric experts (an investigator and a ballistic expert) at state expense was
improperly denied, and the prosecutor's claim during the state's closing argument - that
the appellate courts, not the sentencing jury, would decide his fate - violated his due
process rights. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 & n.1 (1985). Some courts have
tied Caldwell to Ake by requiring an applicant for non-psychiatric expert assistance to show
more than a mere possibility of need to secure expert assistance at state expense. See infra
note 352 and accompanying text.
'5 Ake, 470 U.S. at 72.
16 Id. at 77.
'7 Id. at 87.
18 Ake v. State, 778 P.2d 460,461 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (sentencing Ake to two terms
of two hundred years each).
'9 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
20 Curiously, Ake is discussed in only "due process" terms. See infra notes 75-76 and
accompanying text.
21 William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV.
23, 32 (1991), reprinted in ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL:
JUSTICE FOR ALL 13, 21 (1992). See also The Supreme Court, 1984 Term -Leading Cases,
99 HARV. L. REv. 120, 130-31 (1985) (describing Ake as "a significant new right"); John
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is beyond the scope of this article to determine Ake's overall impact on the law. Yet
it is accurate to say that courts have not limited Ake to capital cases22 or to cases
where only a psychiatrist or psychologist is sought.23
Unfortunately, an ambiguity in Ake limits its utility. Justice Marshall
simultaneously held that an indigent defendant, though entitled to his own
independent expert advocate, was subject to the state's determination of how to
implement that right.24 According to Justice Marshall, that right did not entitle an
indigent to the expert of his choice.25 As a result, courts have struggled with
whether an indigent is entitled to his own independent advocate or a neutral expert
provided by the state. Varied approaches have been employed to resolve this
ambiguity.
The United States Supreme Court has not only failed to confront this
ambiguity, but it has contributed to the confusion by declining to grant certiorari
in several capital cases where Ake appeared to be applicable. 26 Accordingly, lower
federal courts have struggled to decide whether: (1) an indigent defendant is
entitled to an independent psychiatrist, separate from the state's expert; 27 (2) due
process entitles an indigent to a "competent" (one "qualified" to conduct
"appropriate" tests and provide "helpful" opinions consistent with Federal Rules of
Evidence2") psychiatric examination or non-psychiatric29 assistance; and (3)
harmless error analysis applies to an Ake violation."0 Although state court opinions
generally comply withAke's call for apreliminary showing"' and an expert different
from that of the prosecutor, 2 they differ on whether Ake requires an indigent to
receive an expert of his own choice,33 or whether Ake should extend to non-
M. West, Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional
Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1326, 1329 (1986) (describing Ake as a
"breakthrough").
22 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,87 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Nothing in the
Court's opinion reaches noncapital cases."). But cf Goetz v. Crosson, 41 F.3d 800, 803 (2d
Cir. 1994) (citing Ake as authority for the applicability of due process to involuntary civil
commitment proceedings).
23 See infra notes 473-78 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 468-78 and
accompanying text.
24 Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
25 Id.
26 See infra notes 127-88 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 268-346 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 214-67 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 347-79 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 394-460 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 469-72 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 476-81 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 488-511 and accompanying text.
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psychiatric assistance. 4
More importantly, some states have enacted legislation that purports to
supplant Ake." In a few instances, however, states have interpreted their statutes
in a manner that provides less than Ake requires .3 A fair reading of Ake resolves
some of these issues and its troubling ambiguity.
This article argues for several propositions: (1) Ake requires a trial court to
appoint an independent expert for the indigent defendant;" (2) Ake's holding and
concern support providing the indigent with a "competent" psychiatrist and an
appropriate examination - that is, an "expert" who is qualified by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education to provide the court and jury with "helpful" or
"appropriate" information;3" (3) an Ake violation, though subject to harmless error
analysis, is unlikely to be found harmless because an expert's assistance is usually
vital to the indigent's defense;39 (4) because federal and state courts have divergent
interpretations of Ake, defense attorneys must understand the basics of that opinion
and its state law equivalents; 40 (5) because Ake's roots are based in fundamental
fairness and equal protection,41 an indigent is entitled to "an adequate opportunity
to present [his] claims fairly within the adversary system"42 and an opportunity to
secure the "basic tools of an adequate defense";43 and (6) the right to "basic tools"
31 See infra notes 473-83 and accompanying text.
31 See infra note 535-36 and accompanying text.
36 See, e.g., Hudson v. State, 799 S.W.2d 529 (Ark. 1990) (finding a "preliminary
showing" insufficient if the defendant fails to file notice required byARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-
305 (Michie 1987)).
37 See infra notes 73-76 and 116-21 and accompanying text. This conclusion is
supported, in part, by the dissent in Ake. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 92 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
38 FED. R. EvID. 702.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of opinion or otherwise, if(l) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.
Id. (emphasis added). It must be noted that this test is no longer as simple as it was prior to
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and the 2000 amendments to Rule 702.
" See infra notes 426-51 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 73-76 and 116-21 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note land 2 and accompanying text.
42 Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)).
43 Id. (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)). See also infra notes
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should not be limited to psychiatric assistance."
Although the ambiguity in Ake and several other issues limit or minimize its
applicability,45 this article contends that an indigent defendant should be able to
secure, upon a proper showing, psychiatric46 and non-psychiatric47 assistance at
state expense. Moreover, an indigent's right to such assistance should be limited
neither to criminal cases4" nor to capital cases.49 Ake's language and rationale
promised an indigent defendant more opportunities for expert assistance at state
expense than Justice Marshall originally contemplated." However, state and
federal courts have practically nullified the basic promise by failing to apply Ake's
mandate.
I. AKE v. OKLAHOMA
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall gave a succinct, though selective,
version of the facts describing the crime and resulting charges: 1
Late in 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murdering
a couple and wounding their two children. He was arraigned in the
District Court for Canadian County, Okla., in February 1980. His
behavior at arraignment, and in other prearraignment incidents at the jail,
was so bizarre that the trial judge, sua sponte, ordered him to be
examined by a psychiatrist "for the purpose of advising with the Court as
350-79 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 353-93 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 86-106 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 343-93 and accompanying text.
4' Goetz v. Crosson, 41 F.3d 800, 803 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Ake as authority for the
applicability of due process to involuntary civil commitment proceedings).
49 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
'o See infra notes 353-93 and accompanying text.
5 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 90-91. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall's statement of the facts, to the dismay and biting criticism of the dissent, failed to
reveal the "brutal" nature of the murders perpetrated on the victims. Id. On the other hand,
the majority merely referred to these murders at one place in the opinion as "incidents." Id.
at 71. The majority opinion also failed to address: (a) the month-long crime spree and the
defendant's forty-four page confession following the murders; (b) that Ake did not raise the
insanity issue at the time of his arrest, preliminary hearing, or his co-defendant's competency
hearings; (c) that Ake failed to call two "friends" who could testify concerning his actions
that might bear on his sanity at the time of the offense; or (d) that the doctors who treated
Ake could not express a view when questioned about his mental condition. Id. at 90-91
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Despite these omissions, Justice Marshall's statement ofthe facts
commanded the support of seven other justices. Id. at 70.
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to his impressions of whether the Defendant may need an extended
period of mental observation." The examining psychiatrist reported:
"At times [Ake] appears to be frankly delusioned.... He claims to be
the 'sword of vengeance' of the Lord and that he will sit at the left hand
of God in heaven." He diagnosed Ake as a probable paranoid
schizophrenic and recommended a prolonged psychiatric evaluation to
determine whether Ake was competent to stand trial.52
A month later, in March, Ake was committed to a state hospital to be examined
with respect to his present sanity and his competency to stand trial.53 In the
following month, the chief forensic psychiatrist at the state hospital informed the
court that Ake was not competent to stand trial. 4 The court then held a competency
hearing during which a psychiatrist diagnosed Ake as a psychotic suffering from
chronic paranoid schizophrenia.55 Because of the severity of Ake's mental illness,
the psychiatrist recommended that Ake be placed in a maximum security facility
within the state psychiatric hospital system.56 Pursuant to this recommendation, the
trial court "found Ake to be a mentally ill person in need of care and treatment and
incompetent to stand trial, and ordered him committed to the state mental
hospital.""
"Six weeks later, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake
had become competent to stand trial."' This expert determined that if Ake
continued to take the same dosage of Thorazine, an anti-psychotic drug, three times
daily, his condition would remain stable. 9 "The State then resumed proceedings
against Ake."'
At a pretrial conference, Ake's attorney requested the assistance of a
psychiatrist to enable him to adequately prepare and present an insanity defense.6'
The attorney stated that a psychiatrist would have to examine Ake with respect to
his mental condition at the time of the offense.62 "During Ake's three-month stay
at the state hospital, no inquiry had been made into his sanity at the time of the
offense."'63 Because Ake could not afford to pay for his own psychiatrist, his lawyer
11 Id. at 70-71 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
11 Id. at 71.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
" Ake, 470 U.S. at 71 (internal citations omitted).
58 Id.
'9 Id. at 71-72.
60 Id. at 72.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Ake, 470 U.S. at 72.
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asked the court to arrange to have a psychiatrist perform the examination, or to
provide funds to allow the defense to arrange one." The trial judge rejected the
lawyer's argument that the federal Constitution required that an indigent defendant
receive the assistance of a psychiatrist when that assistance is necessary to the
defense.65
Ake was tried for two counts of murder in the first degree, a crime punishable
by death in Oklahoma, and for two counts of shooting with intent to kill. 66 At the
guilt phase of his trial Ake's sole defense was insanity.67 However, on direct
examination during his case-in-chief, Ake's lawyer did not question any of the
psychiatrists who examined Ake about his sanity at the time of the offense.
68
Because none of the experts had examined Ake on that point, each psychiatrist told
the prosecutor on cross-examination that they had neither perfornmed nor seen
results of any examination diagnosing Ake's mental state at the time of the
offense.69 "As a result, there was no expert testimony for either side on Ake's
sanity at the time of the offense."'7 The jury rejected Ake's insanity defense and
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.7
At the sentencing proceeding, the State asked for the death penalty. No
new evidence was presented. The prosecutor relied significantly on the
testimony of the state psychiatrists who had examined Ake, and who had
testified at the guilt phase that Ake was dangerous to society, to establish
the likelihood of his future dangerous behavior. Ake had no expert
witness to rebut this testimony or to introduce on his behalf evidence in
mitigation of his punishment. The jury sentenced Ake to death on each
of the two murder counts, and to 500 years' imprisonment on each of the
two counts of shooting with intent to kill.7'
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court and held that
on these facts, the defendant satisfied his burden of making "a preliminary showing
that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial."73
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
69 Id.
69 Ake,470 U.S. at 71.
70 Id. (emphasis deleted).
71 Id. at 73.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 74; see also id. at 83. The dissent argued that "nowhere in the opinion does the
Court elucidate how [the preliminary showing] requirement is satisfied in this particular
case." Id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority disagreed:
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Consequently, in order to fairly determine the defendant's guilt or innocence (guilt
phase), the defendant required an expert witness.74 Having made this "preliminary
showing," the Court found that the defendant's right to due process had attached.7"
"[W]hen a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of
the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that
a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue if the defendant
cannot otherwise afford one."76
Initially, the "role" of the defendant's expert is described by the Court in a
manner that could arguably be satisfied by a neutral state hospital examiner:
In this role, psychiatrists gather facts, through professional examination,
interviews, and elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or jury;
they analyze the information gathered and from it draw plausible
conclusions about the defendant's mental condition, and about the effects
of any disorder on behavior; and they offer opinions about how the
defendant's mental condition might have affected his behavior at the time
in question. They know the probative questions to ask of the opposing
party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers. Unlike lay
For one, Ake's sole defense was that of insanity. Second, Ake's behavior at
arraignment, just four months after the offense, was so bizarre as to prompt the trial
judge, sua sponte, to have him examined for competency. Third, a state psychiatrist
shortly thereafter found Ake to be incompetent to stand trial, and suggested that he
be committed. Fourth, when he was found to be competent six weeks later, it was
only on the condition that he be sedated with large doses of Thorazine three times
a day, during trial. Fifth, the psychiatrists who examined Ake for competency
described to the trial court the severity of Ake's mental illness less than six months
after the offense in question, and suggested that this mental illness might have
begun many years earlier. Finally, Oklahoma recognizes a defense of insanity,
under which the initial burden of producing evidence falls on the defendant. Taken
together, these factors make clear that the question of Ake's sanity was likely to be
a significant factor in his defense.
Id. at 86 (citation and footnotes omitted).
74 Ake, 470 U.S. at 86.
11 Id. at 87.
76 Id. at 74. For some reason the Court, at various times, required the defendant to show
that his sanity at the time of the offense was likely to be an issue at trial. Yet, in the specific
holding the word "likely" is omitted. Instead, the majority states "that his sanity at the time
of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial." See id. at 83 (emphasis added). Perhaps
this is merely an editing error. If not, then the language in the holding suggests more
certainty is required about the defendant's sanity before it becomes a factor. The word
"likely," though suggesting reasonable probability, hedges somewhat. Hence, according to
the language in the holding, the indigent defendant must make a stronger or more certain
showing.
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witnesses, who can merely describe symptoms they believe might be
relevant to the defendant's mental state, psychiatrists can identify the
"elusive and often deceptive" symptoms of insanity and tell the jury why
their observations are relevant."
Such an expert is neither independent nor confidential.
Later, however, the Court describes more specifically that an indigent's expert
must be one separate and distinct from the state's expert.
By organizing a defendant's mental history, examination results and
behavior, and other information, interpreting it in light of their expertise,
and then laying out their investigative and analytical process to the jury,
the psychiatrists for eachparty enable the jury to make its most accurate
determination of the truth of the issue before them. 78
Moreover, the Court concluded that, without the assistance of an expert for the
indigent defendant, "the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is
extremely high, ' 79 and that the jury will not be assured of receiving enough
information in a meaningful way to allow it to make a "sensible determination."8
In order to secure the assistance of an expert for his defense, a defendant must make
a "preliminary showing" that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a
significant factor at trial. Once the indigent makes this "preliminary showing," the
question becomes how to satisfy this due process right to expert assistance.
The defendant's "preliminary showing" should be considered along with the
trial court's determination of "whether and under what conditions, the participation
of a psychiatrist is important enough to [the] preparation of a defense to require the
State to provide an indigent defendant with access to competent psychiatric
assistance in preparing the defense."8  Although the Court supported its
conclusions by citing Mathews v. Eldridge's82 three-prong test,83 Ake has been
recently justified by another line of cases not reliant upon the Mathews test." In
77 Id. at 80 (citation omitted) (quoting Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950)).
78 Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
79 Ake, 470 U.S. at 82.
go Id.
8' Id. at 77.
82 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
83 Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 ("[T]heprivate interest that will be affected by the action of the
State .. .the governmental interest ... [and] the probable value of the additional or
substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation.")
(emphasis added); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
84 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,444-45 (1992) ("The holding in Ake can be
understood as an expansion of earlier due process cases holding that an indigent criminal
20021
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any event, according to the Court's three-step analysis, an indigent would always
be entitled to expert psychiatric assistance.
Both the majority and the dissent saw an "unfairness" arising when the only
competent witness on the insanity question was hired by the prosecutor's office.85
Yet the majority and dissent disagreed on the role of that independent expert. The
majority held that due process demanded that the expert be an advocate, assisting
in the preparation of the defense.86 On the other hand, the dissent thought due
process demanded no more than a neutral witness. 7 If the Court intended for the
psychiatrist to be the indigent's "assistant," wouldn't the expert always be
"crucial"? Moreover, the dissent's claim that a neutral "assistant" would suffice
defendant is entitled to the minimum assistance necessary to assure him a 'fair opportunity
to present his defense' and 'to participate meaningfully in [the] judicial proceeding."')
(alteration in original) (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 76).
A cursory analysis of Ake's three-step analysis reveals why the Medina "minimum
assistance necessary to assure... a fair opportunity" approach was more coherent. Id. at
445. The first- or"individual interest"- factor was considered established because "[t]he
interest of the individual in the outcome of the State's effort to overcome the presumption
of innocence is obvious and weighs heavily in our analysis." Ake, 470 U.S. at 78. Isn't this
always the case? If so, this element appears superfluous. Second, the "state interest" element
was determined to be insubstantial because: (a) many states and the federal government had
not found the financial burden of providing such indigent assistance so great as to preclude
this assistance; (b) the Court had limited the indigent's right to only one competent
psychiatrist; and (c) the Court found it difficult to identify any interest of the state, other than
in its economy, that weighed against recognition of the right. Id. at 78-79. The Court
concluded that the "State may not legitimately assert an interest in [the] maintenance of a
strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to cast a pall on the
accuracy of the verdict obtained." Id. at 79. Such a government "interest" is "not substantial"
enough to deny an indigent the assistance of a psychiatrist. What would constitute a
"substantial" governmental interest? The Court did not say.
The third factor requires an inquiry into the probable value of the psychiatric
assistance sought, and the risk of error in the proceeding if such assistance was not offered.
Because the federal government and forty states had decided through legislation or judicial
decision that indigent defendants were entitled, under certain circumstances, to the
assistance of a psychiatrist's expertise, the Court reasoned that psychiatry had come to play
a pivotal role in criminal proceedings. Id. Thus, the Court concluded "that when the State
has made the defendant's mental condition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the
punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the
defendant's ability to marshal his defense."Id at 80. "May well be crucial"? Perhaps Justice
Marshall meant that a need for a psychiatrist is "crucial" where the defendant's behavior is
so bizarre that the judge may decide sua sponte that the defendant's conduct at the time of
the act required the explanation of an expert? Suffice it to say that the Court's three-factor
analysis was not self-explanatory.
83 See Ake, 470 U.S. at 81-82; id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 80.
87 Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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lacks credibility because a "neutral witness" is neither an "advocate" nor
necessarily an "assistant." Whether determined under the Court's three-prong test8
or pursuant to Griffin v. Illinois,9 an indigent defendant will always need his own
expert to: (a) "marshal his defense";9" (b) "know the probative questions to ask of
the opposing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers";9' (c) "assist
in preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses";92 (d)
"conduct an appropriate examination and assist in the evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense";93 and (e) offer a well-informed view by an opposing
expert at the penalty phase, and thereby retain a significant opportunity to raise
questions about the state's proof of an aggravating factor in the juror's mind.94
Because of these needs, the Ake Court emphasized that the expert must be an
"advocate" for the indigent defendant. The dissent specifically rejected the call for
an advocate.9" Although the language in Ake is mixed on this point,96 the Court
intended to provide the indigent with an advocate at the guilt and penalty phases of
the criminal process.97
The Ake Court specifically held that its protections were not limited to the
"guilt phase."98 Consequently, when the state presents evidence of an indigent
defendant's future dangerousness" and the defendant's future dangerousness is a
significant factor at the penalty phase,"° Ake mandates that an indigent defendant
receive "the means of presenting evidence to rebut the State's evidence of his future
dangerousness."' 0'1 The dissent found the majority's extension of Ake to the penalty
phase unnecessary and therefore dicta.0" The majority did not address the dissent's
s8 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
8 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
90 Ake, 470 U.S. at 80.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 82.
91 Id. at 83.
" Id. at 84.
95
Finally, even if I were to agree with the Court that some right to a state-appointed
psychiatrist should be recognized here, I would not grant the broad right to "access
to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist
in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense."
Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 83 (emphasis omitted)). "A psychiatrist
is not an attorney, whose job it is to advocate." Id. at 92.
96 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
97 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
9 Ake, 470 U.S. at 83-85.
Id. at 83.
'0o Id. at 86.
'01 Id. at 83.
0, Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("With respect to the necessity of expert
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contention. Nevertheless, the majority explained that both the defendant and the
state have important interests at the sentencing phase of a capital case. The
majority argued that the defendant has a "compelling interest in fair
adjudication,"'0 3 and the state "has a profound interest in assuring that its ultimate
sanction is not erroneously imposed."'' "° Furthermore, the majority rejected
monetary considerations as obstacles to these important interests.' ° On balance,
the Court determined the probable value of expert assistance outweighed the risks
of not providing such assistance.'°6
Having determined that an indigent defendant's due process right to an expert
applied at both the guilt and penalty phases, the Court applied the principles of its
new standard to the facts in Ake. At the guilt phase it was "clear that Ake's mental
state at the time of the offense was a substantial factor in his defense."'0 7 Besides,
the trial court was "on notice" of that fact when the defendant made a request for
a court-appointed psychiatrist. Thereafter, the Court listed six factors that "made
clear" that Ake's sanity was "likely to be" a significant factor in his defense.' 9
Apparently, these factors must be "taken together" to "make clear that Ake's sanity
was likely to be a significant factor in his defense."' 10
During the penalty phase, Ake's "future dangerousness" was also found to be
a significant factor."' This opinion had been stated earlier during the guilt phase,
when the state psychiatrist, who had treated Ake at the state mental hospital,
testified that because of his mental illness, Ake posed a threat of continuing
criminal violence." 2 The Court reasoned that this testimony raised the issue of
psychiatric testimony on the issue of'future dangerousness,' as opposed to sanity at the time
of the offense, there is even less support for the Court's holding.").
103 Id. at 83.
'04 Ake, 470 U.S. at 83-84.
los Id. at 84.
106 Id.
'07 Id. at 86.
108 Id.
"o Id. Those six factors were as follows: (1) "Ake's sole defense was that of insanity";
(2) Ake's behavior at arraignment, just four months after the offense, was so bizarre as to
prompt the trial judge, sua sponte, to have him examined for competency; (3) a state
psychiatrist shortly thereafter found Ake to be incompetent to stand trial, and suggested that
he be committed; (4) when he was found to be competent six weeks later, it was only on the
condition that he be sedated with large doses of Thorazine three times a day, during trial; (5)
the psychiatrists who examined Ake for competency described to the trial court the severity
of Ake's mental illness less than six months after the offense in question, and suggested that
this mental illness might have begun many years earlier; and (6) Oklahoma recognized a
defense of insanity, under which the initial burden of producing evidence falls on the
defendant. Id.
110 Ake, 470 U.S. at 86.
"I Id.
112 Id.
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Ake's "future dangerousness." In addition, this testimony was an aggravating factor
under Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme"3 upon which the prosecutor relied
at sentencing.' 4 Ake, the Court opined, was entitled to the assistance of a
psychiatrist on this issue, and the denial of that assistance deprived him of due
process."
5
Based on these factors, the Court held that when a defendant demonstrates to
the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor
at trial, the state must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of the defense." 6 The Court limited its holding by
providing that the indigent defendant does not have a right to choose a psychiatrist
of his personal liking, nor to receive funds to hire his own, but ultimately left it to
the state to determine how to implement this right."' Ake mandates that a state
must provide an indigent defendant with an independent expert" ' when the
indigent's sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at guilt phase
of a trial or when evidence of hisfrture dangerousness is a significant factor at the
sentencing phase. According to this view, a state is not required to provide or
underwrite this assistance in any particular manner. A state is only required to
provide the indigent with expert assistance necessary to assure meaningful
participation in the adversarial process. However, the mere fact that the defendant's
sanity has been examined by a neutral "' psychiatrist and that psychiatrist has
testified at trial about the subject of that examination does not necessarily assure the
defendant "meaningful access to the judicial process.""'2 Moreover, a "neutral"
expert is not equivalent to an "advocate" or an "assistant." So which is it: an
independent psychiatrist at state expense or the same expert employed by the
prosecutor? The majority did not clearly say, and the dissent preferred an expert
"independent" of the prosecutor's office but not an "advocate" for the defense. '
2
'
Federal and state courts have had to provide the answers.
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RE-EXAMINES AKE
The Court's early attempts to apply Ake were confusing. In 1985, the Court
113 Id.
114 Id.
" Id. at 86-87.
16 Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
117 Id.
118 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
"9 Ake, 470 U.S. at 84-85 (citing and "fundamental[ly]" disagreeing with the holding of
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953)).
120 Id. at 85.
121 Id. at 92.
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granted certiorari and remanded three cases 22 for further consideration in light of
Ake. However, it is fair to say that the defendants in two of the three cases, Bowden
v. Francis23 and Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 24 failed to satisfy Ake's threshold
requirement of a "preliminary showing.'125 Furthermore, it is unclear from the facts
in the third case, Felder v. State,2 6 how Ake could possibly apply. In any event, Ake
did not justify granting certiorari in either of these three cases. Subsequently, the
Court began to deny certiorari in cases where Ake appeared to be applicable.
On the other hand, the Court's denial of certiorari in cases involving Ake
122 Bowden v. Francis, 470 U.S. 1079 (1985) (mem.); Tuggle v. Virginia, 471 U.S. 1096
(1985) (mem.); Felder v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 976 (1985) (mem.).
1 733 F.2d 740 (1 1th Cir. 1984), vacated, 470 U.S. 1079 (1985) (mem.). Defendants
were charged with burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault of an invalid mother and
the murder of her daughter. Both men confessed to all charges shortly after their arrest. The
case was severed for trial and the defendant Bowden was tried frst. Prior to trial, Bowden's
attorney filed a special plea of insanity and moved the trial court for the appointment of a
psychiatrist to evaluate his client. Bowden's attorney sought to have a psychiatrist render
opinions on whether Bowden was competent to stand trial and whether he was insane at the
time he committed the crimes:
At an evidentiary hearing on [Bowden's] motion, counsel presented evidence that,
he contended, suggested that Bowden was incompetent to stand trial. Bowden's
sister and niece . . . testified to certain aspects of Bowden's behavior they
considered bizarre: he would sometimes sit on the bed and rock for hours at a
time; on other occasions he would "cuss out" the children in the family.
Id. at 744.
124 334 S.E.2d 838 (Va. 1985), on remandfrom 471 U.S. 1096 (1985), cert. denied, 478
U.S. 1010 (1986). An indigent defendant in a capital murder case filed a motion requesting
mental evaluations to determine his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of
the offense. The trial court granted the motion solely because it was a capital murder case.
After psychiatric examinations, two doctors reported defendant to be competent and to have
been sane at the time the murder was committed. Later, however, defendant's attorney
moved the court for an examination by a third doctor to determine the same issues as the
previous two doctors. Defendant's attorney argued that Tuggle was "entitled to be examined
by a psychiatrist or group of psychiatrists chosen by counsel for the Defendant because of
the seriousness of the charges heretofore lodged against the defendant." The trial court
denied this motion. Id. at 84 1.
'z See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
126 470 So. 2d 1330 (Ala.), aff'g 470 So. 2d 1321 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), vacated, 474
U.S. 976 (1985) (mem.). The defendant in this capital murder case appealed on the basis
that: (a) the prosecutor conducted an improper cross-examination of the defendant; (b) a
juror was improperly excluded because he expressed general objections to the death penalty;
(c) the defendant was entitled to a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession outside the
presence of the jury; and (d) blacks were systematically excluded from the jury. The
defendant did not make an Ake claim. See Felder v. State, 470 So. 2d 1321, 1324-26 (Ala.
Crin. App. 1984), affd, 470 So. 2d 1330 (Ala.), vacated, 474 U.S. 976 (1985) (mem.).
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claims has been equally perplexing. As the following analysis reveals, the Court
has denied certiorari in several cases where the accused had not only made a
sufficient thresholdshowing, but the accused had also established that the testimony
of a psychiatrist was vital to his defense. Denying certiorari in these cases has
resulted in conflicting approaches among the circuit courts.
A. Brown v. Dodd
In Brown v. Dodd,'27 the Court denied certiorari to a death-row inmate. The
defendant in Dodd had a history of severe mental illness."'2 At the time of his arrest
for murder in 1975, he had already been institutionalized on three prior occasions. 2 9
For six years after his arrest the defendant was committed to the Central State
Hospital.'30 During that period, the medical staff at the hospital alternatively found
the defendant incompetent, competent, and then finally incompetent to stand trial
in 1981.' 3
In 1981, the defendant filed a motion for a speedy trial.' The judge
scheduled a competency hearing before a special jury.' On the morning of that
hearing, the judge appointed an expert to evaluate the defendant's competency.' 34
The "expert" was not a licensed psychiatrist. In fact, not only had he failed the state
licensing examination, but he had received no formal training in conducting
competency evaluations. 35  Even so, after a twenty-minute competency
examination, the court-appointed expert concluded that the defendant was
competent to stand trial.'36 The special jury agreed, and three months later the
defendant was tried and convicted of murder and sentenced to death.'"
Justice Marshall argued that the Court should have granted certiorari in this
case. Initially, he observed that "a number of experts" appeared at the defendant's
habeas hearing and testified that the state's expert was not qualified and that the
court-appointed expert's competency examination was substandard. 38 In light of
this testimony, Justice Marshall could not understand how the trial judge found the
court-appointed "expert" qualified by education and experience to give an opinion
127 484 U.S. 874 (1985) (mem.).
128 Id. at 875 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129 Id.
130 id.
131 Id.
132 id.
133 Brown, 484 U.S. at 875.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
13 Id.
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as to the defendant's sanity. ' Marshall rejected the trial judge's "unexplained"
finding that its "expert" was qualified. He determined that the testimony of the
experts at the habeas hearing and the guarantee of Ake required a different result.
Justice Marshall opined that the defendant had sufficiently demonstrated
pursuant to Ake that his sanity at the time of the offense would be a significant
factor at trial'" He emphasized that once the defendant has made this threshold
showing, the state must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in the
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. 4' Ake, Marshall argued,
assured not just access to a psychiatrist, but the "assistance" of a competent
professional to perform an appropriate examination. 4" He equated a defendant's
constitutional right to a competent psychiatrist to that of a defendant's right to a
competent attorney under the Sixth Amendment. 143Although the Ake Court did not directly discuss the qualifications of the
indigent's expert, it is reasonable to conclude that only a "qualified" expert would
be "helpful" to the indigent defendant and ultimately to the trier of fact.' 44 Ake was
particularly concerned with the potential "risk" that the insanity issue would be
inaccurately resolved."' Hence, its chief objective was to provide the jury with
reliable information so that it could "make its most accurate determination of the
truth on the issue before them."'" Although not directly discussed or emphasized
by the Court, Ake's language and holding reasonably require a trial court to admit
only the opinions of a qualified expert - one who could "assist" (i.e., be "helpful"
to) the trier of fact.147 Unfortunately, the defendant in Dodd could not command the
necessary four votes on the Court to address this issue.
B. Granviel v. Texas
In Granviel v. Texas,148 the United States Supreme Court again denied
9 Brown, 484 U.S. 875-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 876 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141 id.
142 id.
141 Id. Most federal and state courts have declined to interpret such a requirement inAke.
See infra notes 257-66 and accompanying text.
'4 See supra note 38.
14' Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81-82 (1985).
'4 Id. at 81.
'47 See id. ("By organizing a defendant's mental history, examination results and
behavior, and other information, interpreting it in light of their expertise... the psychiatrists
for each party enable the jury to make its most accurate determination.") (emphasis added).
See also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
14 495 U.S. 963 (1990) (mem.).
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certiorari. The defendant was tried for capital murder in 1983.1419 Prior to trial,
defendant requested that the court appoint a mental health expert to help him
prepare an insanity defense.'5° The defendant specifically asked that the expert's
report not be made available to the prosecution.' The Texas trial court denied
defendant's request for confidential expert assistance.'52 Instead, the trial court
appointed a "disinterested" (neutral) expert whose report would go to both the
defense and prosecution pursuant to Texas statute. 53 Though the defendant had
specifically asked the trial judge for a confidential psychiatrist," the Texas trial
court presumably "satisfied" Ake by providing the indigent defendant with a
"disinterested" expert.
Justice Marshall's dissent'55 emphasized that once a defendant made the
preliminary showing required byAke, he was entitled to a competent,'56 separate,57
and perhaps confidential'58 expert. Even the dissent in Ake reasoned that the
indigent was entitled to an expert different from the prosecutor's expert. 59 In any
event, by denying certiorari the Court allowed Texas to "satisfy" Ake by supplying
the indigent defendant with a "disinterested" but not a "confidential" expert.
'4' Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15o Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
'5 Id. at 963-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The statute provided:
(a) If notice of intention to raise the insanity defense is filed .... the court
may, on its own motion or motion by the defendant, his counsel, or the prosecuting
attorney, appoint disinterested experts experienced and qualified in mental health
and mental retardation to examine the defendant with regard to the insanity defense
and to testify thereto at any trial or hearing on this issue.
(b) The court may order any defendant to submit to examination for the
purposes described in this article....
(c) The court shall advise any expert appointed pursuant to this section of the
facts and circumstances of the offense with which the defendant is charged and the
elements of the insanity defense.
(d) A written report of the examination shall be submitted to the court within
30 days of the order of examination, and the court shall furnish copies of the report
to the defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney.
Id. at 964 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(3)
(Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1990)).
4 Granviel, 495 U.S. at 963 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155 Id.
156 See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
'5 See infra notes 324-28 and accompanying text.
15' Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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C. Vickers v. Arizona
In Vickers v. Arizona,60 the United States Supreme Court again denied
certiorari. The defendant was convicted of murdering a prison inmate and
sentenced to death.' 6' His only defense at trial was insanity. 162 The defendant
claimed that he suffered from temporal lobe epilepsy, a brain disorder that can
cause violent behavior and render a person unable to appreciate the nature and
wrongfulness of his acts. 63 This claimed disorder was substantially confirmed by
the court-appointed psychiatrist.'"
Although he had performed an extensive interview of the defendant and
conducted an "exhaustive" review of his medical history, 65 the court-appointed
psychiatrist stated that he could not make a definitive diagnosis without certain
neuropsychological testing.'" As a result of the court-appointed expert's
recommendation, the defendant asked the trial court to provide him access to this
diagnostic testing. 6 To support his request, the defendant attached the affidavits
of three other psychiatrists and the testimony of the state's own expert (from the
defendant's competency hearing) who all agreed that strong evidence indicated that
the defendant suffered from a mental disorder which impaired his capacity to make
rational judgments, but that diagnostic testing was necessary before a firm
conclusion could be reached. 68
Despite the consensus of these medical experts that diagnostic testing was
necessary, the court denied the defendant's request. 69 Instead of these experts, the
trial court relied on a two-paragraph letter from a psychiatrist appointed at the
state's request. 7 ' This newly court-appointed expert based his conclusion on a
"quick" review of the defendant's medical records, conversations with prisoners and
prison staff, and a "brief' interview with the defendant.' 7' Based on this "review,"
the newly appointed expert concluded that "there is absolutely nothing to suggest
that this man is epileptic' and that 'further diagnostic testing.., would be totally
superfluous. '"172
160 497 U.S. 1033 (1990) (mem.).
161 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Vickers, 497 U.S. at 1034 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167 Id.
169 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Vickers, 497 U.S. at 1034 (internal quotations omitted).
[Vol. 10:2
AKE V. OKLAHOMA
The defendant failed to persuade the court to reconsider its order denying the
diagnostic test.'73 Even though the defendant's motion for reconsideration was
supported by affidavits from the first court-appointed expert, one of the three
original psychiatrists supporting his first motion, two neurologists, and the
affidavits of four experts who "vehemently" contested the opinion of the trial
judge's newly appointed expert, 7 the court denied defendant's requests for further
testing. 75
Justice Marshall excoriated the Court's denial of certiorari.76  Justice
Marshall argued that Ake controlled this case. He contended that when a defendant
demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a
significant factor at trial, the state must, at a minimum, provide the defendant with
a competentpsychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. 7 1 "The right to a
competent psychiatrist," Marshall reasoned, "necessarily includes the right to have
the State provide the psychiatrist with the tools he requires to conduct an adequate
examination and evaluation of the defendant.' 7' Here, he added, that testing
required by the first appointed psychiatrist "must be considered one of 'the raw
materials integral to the building of an effective defense' that the State must
provide."' 79 Justice Marshall concluded that "Ake requires the appointment of a
psychiatrist who will assist in the preparation of the defense, not one who will
merely give an independent assessment to the judge orjury."'' 8 He argued that the
trial court's newly appointed expert could not "veto" the first court appointed
expert's request for diagnostic testing. ' To do so, he concluded, would make that
"right" meaningless. 2 Further, Marshall rejected as inconsistent with Ake', 3 the
notion that a trial court could reject the requests of an indigent defendant's expert
solely because it would be too expensive.8 4 Ake's unmistakable language was used
by Marshall to underscore his conclusion:
As we held in Ake, the State's interest in preserving its fisc is not
substantial when compared with the compelling interest of both the
173 Id.
' Id. at 1034-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 1034 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 1035-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17 Id. at 1035 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171 Vickers, 497 U.S. at 1035.
"' Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985)).
"0 Id. at 1036 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 83).
181 Id.
"2 Id. at 1037 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
183 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
'14 Vickers, 497 U.S. at 1037 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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defendant and the State in the fair and accurate adjudication of a criminal
case, particularly one in which the defendant's life is at stake.' 5
Finally, Justice Marshall argued that Ake did not contemplate the application
of harmless error analysis.'86 His harmless error argument was his weakest position.
The Court'sjurisprudence on harmless error has never prohibited this doctrine from
being applied to a case that did not initially address that issue.' 7 Suffice it to say
that the Court has unequivocally applied harmless error analysis to Ake errors.'a
8
Because the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in several cases,
lower courts have had to decide whether an Ake violation occurred: (1) when the
indigent made the requisite preliminary showing and the trial court failed to appoint
an expert; (2) when defense counsel failed to request the appointment of a
psychiatrist at the guilt phase or otherwise failed to present mitigating evidence at
the sentencing (penalty) phase; (3) when an appointed expert was unqualified and
his evaluations substandard; (4) when the appointed expert's report was not
confidential but submitted to the prosecutor as well as the defense attorney; or (5)
when a court-appointed expert's requests for further testing is vetoed by a later
court appointed expert. Courts have also had to decide whether harmless error
analysis applies to Ake violations.
III. FEDERAL COURTS APPLY AKE
A. The "Preliminary Showing"
Ake held that:
[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the
time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the state must, at
a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of the defense. 9
The Court contemplated an exparte threshold showing.'90 Generally, federal courts
have decided that an indigent who satisfies Ake's three-step test' 9' may secure either
"' Id. (citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 78-79).
186 Id.
187 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1966) (holding that some constitutional
errors may be harmless); see infra notes 405-25 and accompanying text.
"' Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10, 14 (1995).
'89 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
'9' Id. at 82.
'9' See.supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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psychiatric or non-psychiatric tools for his defense. 92 Those courts have held that
Ake requires a state court to take precautions to assure that the defendant has a fair
opportunity to present his defense. 3 To determine what a "basic tool" is for an
indigent's defense, federal courts hold that Ake requires a consideration of three
factors: the individual's private interest; the government's interest; and the value
of the additional safeguard.'94 The third prong (value of the additional safeguard)
is usually the key.' Still, federal courts have not applied Ake consistently.
In some states, a jury is specifically instructed to "weigh" statutory,
aggravating, and mitigating factors before a sentence is imposed.'96 Therefore,
when a sentencing body "weighs" an invalid aggravating factor (an Ake violation)
in its decision, a reviewing court may not assume that the mistake would not have
made a difference. In such a situation, the "weighing" process has been skewed and
only constitutional harmless error analysis or "re-weighing".at the sentencing or
appellate stage suffices.'97 On the other hand, some states do not specifically
instruct a jury to consider all factors before imposing a sentence. In a "non-
weighing" state, once the sentencing body finds at least one valid aggravating
factor, the fact that it also finds an invalid aggravating factor (for example an Ake
violation) neither infects the formal process nor subsequently invalidates the
remaining valid aggravating factors.'9
Because Ake specifically left the method for implementing the right to the
states, the varied state approaches to Ake are difficult to reconcile. For example, the
fact that a state trial court waited until eleven days before trial to appoint a
psychiatric expert did not warrant federal habeas relief, especially where the
indigent only vaguely stated how he was prejudiced.'" Thus, a defendant must
show more than a late appointment. He must show that he was prejudiced.
Similarly, an indigent who requests non-psychiatric experts must demonstrate
something more than a mere possibility of assistance from a requested expert.20 °
192 Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, 130 (Ist Cir. 1987) (petitioner who was convicted of
automobile theft successfully challenged New Hampshire's discretionary appeals procedure
which denied him a trial transcript on discretionary appeal).
'9 Tyson v. Keane, 991 F. Supp. 314,325 (S.D.N.Y.), aftd, 159 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998)
(petitioner who was convicted of rape successfully challenged the trial court's denial of
approving payment for an expert voice analyst).
'94 Id. at 324 (quoting Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1992)). But see supra
notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
195 Id.
196 Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he difference
between a weighing State and a nonweighing State is not one of 'semantics' as the Court of
Appeals thought, but of critical importance.").
197 Id. at 1363.
198 Id.
'99 Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1993).
200 Id. at 227 (denying appointment of and funding for forensic and ballistic experts to
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Rather, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that an expert would aid
in his defense and that the denial of an expert to assist at trial would result in a
fundamentally unfair trial."' Some federal trial courts have held that non-
psychiatric experts should only be provided if the evidence is "both 'critical' to the
conviction and subject to varying expert opinion.""2 2
One federal court has held that an indigent is not entitled to the appointment
of psychiatric assistance at the penalty phase when the state has presented no
evidence of the indigent's future dangerousness. °3 Yet another has concluded that
there is no Ake violation where an indigent merely "'demonstrated to the trial judge'
his desire to proceed with an alibi defense and not an insanity defense., 24 On the
other hand, a few federal circuits have found trials to be unfair if the indigent was
not provided an expert after making the required preliminary showing. A state
must, according to these opinions, provide an indigent defendant access to a
psychiatrist's assistance if the defendant makes a preliminary showing that his
sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial.03 If an
indigent makes such a preliminary showing, a denial of such expert assistance
would result in an unfair trial.2" Moreover, psychiatric assistance in the evaluation,
assist in preparing the indigent's defense that he fired in self-defense, and that the shot
which mortally wounded his wife's boyfriend was actually fired by his wife).
20, Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
202 Yohey, 985 F.2d at 227 (quoting Scott v. Louisiana, 934 F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir.
1991)).
203 Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 188 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1120
(2001).
204 Lowenfieldv. Phelps, 671 F. Supp. 423,436 (E.D. La.), aft'd,817 F.2d 285 (SthCir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988).
20 E.g., Branscomb v. Norris, 47 F.3d 258, 262 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1109
(1995); Starrv. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1287 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 995 (1994);
Guinan v. Armontrout, 909 F.2d 1224, 1227-28 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that "counsel's
belief that Guinan suffered from a mental disease... [is] not supported by example or more
detailed explanation, cannot be said to have demonstrated to the trial judge that Guinan's
mental state was to be a significant issue at trial," and declining to establish a per se rule for
a mental evaluation), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074 (1991); see also Williams v. Calderon, 52
F.3d 1465, 1474 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996):
[Defendant] never moved for appointment of an independent psychiatrist, nor did
he ever attempt to demonstrate to the judge that his mental state would be at issue.
[Defendant's] counsel made only an informal, in camera inquiry as to whether any
"investigatory funds" might be available; the "impression" he received was that
none were. Such a nonspecific inquiry does not satisfy [defendant's] obligation "to
make an exparte threshold showing" of the need for a psychiatrist.
206 Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1210 (1988).
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preparation, and presentation of a defense is constitutionally required where the
accused's mental condition is crucial to his defense, whether that condition is
insanity or mental retardation." 7
At the penalty phase, where an indigent has made the requisite "preliminary
showing" of a right to an expert to present mitigation through an appropriate
examination, the state has failed to meet its obligations under Ake if its expert's
examinations were limited to determining whether the petitioner was competent to
stand trial and sane at the time of the offense." 8 In a capital case where the
defendant had only received an examination for competency and sanity, one court
found that this deprived the defendant of his right to "an expert to make an
appropriate examination and to explain the effects of his retardation on his relative
culpability at the sentencing phase of the proceedings."2"9 Conversely, a court is not
required to appoint a psychiatrist for someone whose defense already has the
wherewithal to pay for an appropriate psychiatric examination.1
A defendant who files a habeas petition21" ' claiming an Ake violation must also
satisfy Ake's "preliminary showing." For example, a petitioner was not entitled to
a writ of habeas corpus because he claimed that he was denied the assistance of a
psychiatric expert during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. A federal court
held that the indigent failed to demonstrate to the state trial court "a reasonable
probability that the requested expert would aid in the defendant's defense and that
the denial of expert assistance would result in an unfair trial."2"2 Moreover, courts
have held that federal rules specifically provide that a habeas petition which is
based on an untimely Ake claim may be dismissed. 13
207 Starr, 23 F.3d at 1288.
208 Boliek v. Bowersox, 96 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Starr, 23 F.3d at
1290).
20 Starr, 23 F.3d at 1290.
210 Boliek, 96 F.3d at 1074 (citing Starr, 23 F.3d at 1289).
211 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994):
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
21. McDonald v. Bowersox, 101 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Guinan v.
Armontrout, 909 F.2d 1224, 1227 (8th Cir. 1990)) (denying habeas where defendant had
previously made several unsuccessful requests).
213 See, e.g., Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606, 617-18 (holding that Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts Rule 9 provides a basis for dismissal
of a petition), amended by 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910 (1992):
Rule 9(a) provides that a habeas claim may be dismissed upon a showing that: (1)
the state has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the claim; and (2) this
20021
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Ake and the cases interpreting it make clear an indigent defendant may not
receive state or federal funded assistance until the "preliminary showing" is made.
Courts have been less clear about what kind of assistance the indigent is entitled.
B. The Right to the Effective Assistance of a "Competent" Expert
1. Ake specifically held that "competence" matters
[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the
time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at
a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of the defense."z 4
The Court's concern was that the indigent defendant have access to a competent or
"qualified"215 psychiatrist for those express purposes.23 6 Hence, Ake's specific
holding and concern require providing the indigent defendant with a "competent"
psychiatrist and an appropriate examination at both the guilt and penalty stages of
the criminal process. "Competent" expert is a qualifier that connotes one who by
skill, training, education, or otherwise can provide "helpful" information to the
judge and jury.2 17 A qualified expert is also a person capable of conducting
"appropriate" examinations.2"
When discussing the need for a psychiatrist at the penalty phase, the Court
prejudice resulted from petitioner's delay; and (3) the petitioner has not acted with
reasonable diligence as a matter of law. As the district court correctly concluded,
the state was prejudiced in its ability to respond to Harris's Ake claim and new
evidence claim because it now cannot depose either of Harris's trial psychiatrists.
Dr. Read is dead. Dr. Rodgers is abroad and may not be able to recall exactly what
materials he reviewed in a case eleven years ago.
Rule 9(b) allows for dismissal of a "second or successive petition" if it fails to
allege a "new or different ground for relief and the prior determination was on the
merits" or if the failure to assert the new grounds constituted an "abuse of the
writ."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 foll. Rule 9(b) (1988)).
214 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (emphasis added).
25 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
216 Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
217 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
28 Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
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stated that "due process requires access to a psychiatric examination." 9 This
statement should be read in the context of the immediately preceding sentence
which clearly infers "competent" examination: "Without a psychiatrist's assistance,
the defendant cannot offer a well-informed expert's opposing view, and thereby
loses a significant opportunity to raise in the juror's minds questions about the
State's proof of an aggravating factor."22
The Court explained that this language means that the fact-finder must have
before it "both the views of the prosecutor's psychiatrists and the 'opposing views
of the defendant's doctors."' 22' Therefore, an indigent's expert must be "competent
[(qualified)] to 'uncover, recognize, and take due account of.. . shortcomings' in
predictions"2 2 on the indigent defendant's future dangerousness. Ake contemplated
a "competent" psychiatrist and an "appropriate" examination at both the guilt and
penalty phases. Some courts have followed this interpretation.223 The majority of
courts have determined, however, that neither the "competency" of a psychiatrist
nor the "inappropriateness" of his test implicate Ake. 24 Curiously, the authority for
this position is not based on Ake, but is found in the dictum from a 1990 Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion.
Silagy v. Peters225 is the most frequently quoted authority for the proposition
that an allegedly "incompetent" diagnosis by a court-appointed psychiatrist does not
raise an Ake violation.226 In Silagy, a state prisoner argued in his habeas petition
that he was denied due process because his court-appointed psychiatrists were
"incompetent" because they "accepted as reality" petitioner's false statements
regarding his experiences in Vietnam.227 The petitioner conveyed this false
information to two of his three court-appointed psychiatrists.22 He argued that he
was denied due process because the jury relied on this false information in order to
reach their decision to impose the death penalty.229 All of these arguments were
rejected.
219 Id. at 84.
22I d. (emphasis added).
221 Id. (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983)).
222 Id. (emphasis added) (omission in original).
223 Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 908 F.2d 695 (11 th
Cir. 1990).
224 See infra notes 254-62 and accompanying text.
225 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110 (1991).
226 Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606, 620, amended by 949 U.S. F.2d 1497 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910 (1992); Clisby v. Jones, 907 F.2d 1047, 1049 (1 1th Cir.
1990); Williams v. Vasquez, 817 F. Supp. 1443, 1468 (E.D. Cal. 1993); Summerville v.
Warden, 641 A.2d 1356, 1376 (Conn. 1994).
227 Silagy, 905 F.2d at 1012.
221 Id. at 1001. The third expert supported the defendant's argument that the other two
were "incompetent."
229 Id.
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The federal court observed that the petitioner's arguments and his supporting
affidavit from the third court-appointed psychiatrist failed to acknowledge key
information from the trial. For example, the other two psychiatrists expressly stated
in their trial testimonies that they did not "accept as reality" petitioner's
fabrications. 230 As a result, the court found no factual basis in the record to confirm
the "incompetence" of the two experts.23 '
Having disposed of the petitioner's claim, the court theorized on how it would
handle a claim of incompetence "[e]ven were this not the case. 232 Presumably, the
court meant even where the record actually showed that the experts are
incompetent. According to the court, it would be "reluctant to open up this type of
Ake claim to a battle of the experts in a 'competence' review."233 What battle? The
Silagy court decided in a three-paragraph analysis that the three court-appointed
experts were "competent., 234 There was no complex analysis or heavy "intellectual
lifting" to reach that conclusion. Moreover, if a court determines that experts or
their diagnoses are incompetent, what other determination is required?
The Silagy court returned to the petitioner's allegations and repeated how all
three experts conducted "competent" examinations and diagnoses.235 The court
reasoned that a contrary conclusion would require it and other federal courts to
engagein a form ofpsychiatric "medical malpractice" review.236 The court declined
to conduct such a review. As Silagy itself shows, once a court has determined that
the experts and their diagnoses are competent, no further "battle" is necessary. The
same result follows where a court finds the experts "incompetent." The United
States Supreme Court has recently held that federal judges have sufficient capacity
to undertake this "gatekeeping" responsibility. 237 Unfortunately, the allure of
Silagy's dicta has caused other courts to adopt it without further analysis.238
2. Language From Ake - Regarding "Competence" and "Independence"
Ake contemplated that an indigent defendant must be afforded an opportunity
to make an exparte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity was likely to
be a significant factor in his defense. 39 Once the court determines that "showing"
230 Id. at 1012. The court noted that while one appointed expert's testimony indicated
some reliance on the false information, the other was skeptical.
231 Id. at 1013.
232 Id.
233 Silagy, 905 F.2d at 1013.
134 Id. at 1012-13.
131 Id. at 1013.
236 id.
237 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
238 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
239 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985).
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has been made, then the "State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to
a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense."2" The Court's concern
was that the defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist for the purpose of
assisting him in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of his defense. 241
This conclusion, Ake reasoned, compels the appointment of a psychiatrist for an
indigent defendant "in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding, when the
State presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness. 242
Because the court concluded that in order for the jury to sufficiently rely on
psychiatric testimony on the question of future dangerousness, it must have before
it "both the views of the prosecutor's psychiatrists and the 'opposing views of the
defendant's doctors.""'24 Further evidence of the Court's conclusion that an
indigent was entitled to a "competent" independent psychiatrist is contained in the
following passage:
In such a circumstance, where the consequence of error is so great, the
relevance of responsive psychiatric testimony so evident, and the burden
on the State so slim, due process requires access to a psychiatric
examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and
to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase.2"
According to Ake, only a competent/independent psychiatrist could assist the
indigent defendant in evaluating, preparing, and presenting his defense. Some
courts have read Ake differently.
Ake specifically held that "when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge
that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State
must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist.""24 Although the Court later
repeated that its concern is that the "indigent defendant have access to a competent
psychiatrist,""4 it did not otherwise explain the characteristics of a "competent"
expert. Courts have consistently held,247 however, that an indigent is not entitled
to a "competent" expert in the same constitutional sense as "competent" counsel24
240 Id. at 83.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 84 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983)).
244 Id. (emphasis added).
245 Id. at 83.
246 Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
247 See infra notes 257-67 and accompanying text.
241 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that in order to show that his
lawyer was "ineffective," a defendant has the burden of showing: (1) that the attorney's
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for Sixth Amendment2 49 purposes.
For courts to hold, without more, that an indigent is not entitled to a
"competent" psychiatric-expert in the same constitutional sense as "competent"
counsel for Sixth Amendment purposes merely begs the question. Why not? The
United States Supreme Court has held that an indigent may claim a "right" to both
a psychiatrist and counsel. The "right" to a psychiatrist25 and counsel25" ' is justified
in part on a due process analysis. More importantly, "[t]he proper measure of
attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms."" Surely the "proper measure" of a psychiatric expert's performance can
be no less. 2" Regrettably, courts have refused to recognize that the deficient
performance of an expert constitutes an Ake violation.
3. A "Competent" or "Effective" Expert?
In a habeas corpus petition from a state court conviction, Poyner v. Murray
25 4
held that there is no Ake violation for the deficient performance of the indigent's
expert.255 Petitioner argued that the psychiatrists and psychologists who evaluated
him prior to the penalty phases of his trials failed to conduct psychological tests of
the type necessary to determine whether he fit into one of the five categories of
"serial killers" identified by a medical scholar.256 The court found no right to the
"effective assistance" of an expert witness similar to that of the effective assistance
of counsel.257 The court stated that "the constitutionally deficient performance must
be that of counsel, in obtaining the psychiatric examinations or presenting the
performance was deficient; and (2) that deficient performance prejudiced the defense).
249 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and accordingly requires the state to
make appointed counsel available to indigent defendants in all criminal prosecutions).
250 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
251 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341 ("We think the Court in Betts had ample precedent for
acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards
of liberty immune from federal abridgement are equally protected against state invasion by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amehdment." (Referring to Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942)).
252 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
253 But cf Carlton Bailey, Daubert and Kumho: Two Cases Creating One Confused
Standard, ARK. TRIAL LAW. DOCKET, Winter 2001, at 20 (arguing, among other things, that
the admissibility of expert evidence has been made more difficult and problematic by
Daubert v. Dow Merrell Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 507 U.S. 579 (1993) and its progeny).
254 964 F.2d 1404 (4th Cir. 1992).
255 Id. at 1418.
256 Id. at 1417.
257 Id. at 1418; see also infra note 262.
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evidence at trial., 25 Deficient performance, the court concluded, does not include
the psychiatrist's or psychologist's failure "to identify every possible malady or
argument, no matter how tenuous." '259 Furthermore, the court found the attorney's
performance in obtaining and presenting psychological evidence as a mitigating
factor that fell "well within the range of reasonable professional standards '2 ' as
required by the United States Supreme Court's benchmark opinion for effective
representation.26'
Other circuits have consistently rejected the notion that there is either a
procedural or constitutional rule of ineffective assistance of an expert witness,
similar to the ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 2 Courts have focused instead on
the attorney's failure to request expert assistance. For example, in Wainwright v.
Norris,263 a lawyer's performance was found to be deficient because he failed to
present important testimony to the court and because he failed to secure the
necessary funds for a non-psychiatric expert from an accommodating court. 2"
Nonetheless, the Norris court declined to reverse defendant's conviction because
there was not a "reasonable probability" that the results of the penalty phase would
have been different without those failures by counsel.265 In order for an indigent to
raise a successful constitutional challenge that his lawyer was ineffective, he must
not only show that the lawyer failed to secure funds from an accommodating court,
but also show that said failure prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings. 2? " Courts
are split as to whether Ake entitles an indigent to a neutral expert or an independent
advocate.261
4. A "Neutral" Expert
21 Id. at 1419.
259 Id.; see also id. at 1419 n. 12 ("The [Ake] Court disavowed any suggestion that the
holding created a constitutional right of a defendant to choose a psychiatrist of his 'personal
liking."' (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 79,83)).
260 Poyner, 964 F.2d at 1420.
26' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
262 Wilsonv. Green, 155 F.3d 396, 401-02 (4thCir.) (holding thatAke does not guarantee
an appropriate examination), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1012 (1998); Sidebottom v. Delo, 46
F.3d 744, 753 (8th Cir.) (finding no ineffectiveness of counsel where counsel for petitioner
failed to "shop around" for a psychiatrist willing to testify to the presence of more elaborate
or grave psychological disorders by the petitioner), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 849 (1995);
United States v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213,250 (C.A.A.F. 1994) (finding counsel's decision not
to use a mental health professional's testimony was a reasonable tactical choice), aff'd, 517
U.S. 748 (1996).
2"63 872 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Ark. 1994), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 968 (1996).
264 Id. at 586.
265 id.
266 Id.
267 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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Granviel v. Lynaugh268 is the leading case interpreting Ake to require only a
neutral expert. Kenneth Granviel confessed that he tortured and murdered six
women and a two-year-old child.269 Seven years later, he was indicted for one of
those murders.2 70 The next year, after a two-month trial, a jury found him guilty of
capital murder.27' The same jury imposed the death penalty after a separate
punishment proceeding.272 The defendant's conviction was affirmed on appeal and
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.2" The defendant was denied
collateral relief in state court.274 Later that year, the defendant filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in United States District Court.27 The district court denied
the requested relief and dismissed his petition.276  He appealed to the Fifth
Circuit.27
7
Although the defendant raised many claims,278 the court gave little
consideration to his Ake allegation. He had asserted that the "unavailability of an
independent expert denied him the opportunity to meaningfully defend himself. 279
The court held his sanity, though "certainly in genuine dispute," did not require any
more than the Texas procedure allowed - the right to a court-appointed
psychiatrist available to both sides.80
The court determined that "' [a] psychiatrist's examination is not an adversary
proceeding." 28' Its purpose, the court continued, "'is not to aid in the establishment
of facts showing that an accused committed certain acts constituting a crime; rather
268 881 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 963 (1990).
269 Id. at 187.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 id.
273 Granviel v. Lynaugh, 495 U.S. 963 (1990) (mem.). See infra notes 148-59 and
accompanying text.
274 Granviel, 881 F.2d at 187.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id. The defendant "argue[d] that two prospective jurors ... were improperly excused
for cause on the basis of their opposition to the death penalty." Id. The defendant claimed
that the trial court's refusal to permit an expert witness to testify that the death penalty does
not deter crime prevented him from presenting mitigating evidence that should have been
considered by the jury. Id. at 189. The defendant also claimed that his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel were violated when the prosecutor was allowed to rebut his insanity defense with
the testimony of his examining psychiatrists; the defendant had not been given Miranda
warnings prior to the examinations. Id. at 190. All of these claims were rejected. Id. at 189-
91.
279 Id. at 191.
280 Granviel, 881 F.2d at 191.
281 Id. (quoting Stultz v. State, 500 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)).
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its sole purpose is to enable an expert to form an opinion as to an accused's mental
capacity ....,282 According to Granviel, an indigent is only entitled to a "neutral"
expert because he is not entitled to shop around for a favorable expert.2" 3 However,
it is equally plausible that this admonition is compatible with providing an indigent
with an independent expert. Furthermore, a favorable expert need not give an
opinion but may assist in whatever (other) manner the indigent deems advisable.
Notwithstanding these counter theories, Granviel concluded that an indigent was
only entitled to a neutral expert because this indigent "had been provided an
unbiased expert of his own choosing in the first trial. 284 If an indigent is limited
to a "neutral" expert because he has had an expert of his choice in a previous
hearing, then Granviel is a limited holding by its own language. Presumably, the
court determined that this indigent had received more than he was entitled to under
Ake. Inexplicably, however, the court quoted language from Ake that supports an
independent expert:
[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the
time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at
a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of the defense.2"'
Despite this incongruity, Granviel steadfastly champions a "neutral" expert to
satisfy Ake. A court's denial of an independent partisan expert, concluded
Granviel, would not offend Ake.286 Neither Granviel's citations, quotes, nor its
reasoning support this conclusion. Nevertheless, other courts have adopted
Granviel's holding and rationale,'" or held that a neutral expert may be appointed
where the required testimony involves precise measurements and chemical
testing.28 Other courts have held that a trial court's denial of an independent expert
22 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Stultz, 500 S.W.2d at 855).
283 Id. at 192.
2M Id.
285 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985)).
286 See Granviel, 881 F.2d at 191-92 ("[Defendant] alleges that the unavailability of an
independent expert denied him the opportunity to meaningfully defend himself...
Availability of a neutral expert... complies with the mandate of the Constitution.")
(emphasis added).
211 See, e.g., Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 889 F.2d 69, 75 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Clisby v. Jones, 907 F.2d 1047, 1049
(1 1th Cir. 1990), affid on reh 'g en banc, 960 F.2d 925 (11 th Cir. 1992).
288 Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1253 (Ind. 1995).
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is a violation of Ake.289
5. Smith v. McCormick - Independent-Confidential Psychiatrist
Smith v. McCormick29 ° is the seminal case interpreting Ake to require an
independent-confidential expert. Initially, the defendant in Smith pled not guilty to
two counts of aggravated kidnapping and two counts of deliberate homicide.29" '
Several months later he moved to change his plea to guilty and then he asked for the
death penalty.292 "He stated that he wanted a death sentence because he had
received threats against his life. from Native American prisoners, and because
having spent nearly half his life in prison, he saw no reason to continue living in
prison. '
293
After accepting his guilty plea, the trial court convened a sentencing hearing
to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in his case. 94 The state
presented no witnesses and the defendant reiterated his request to die.295
Furthermore, the defendant informed the court that there were no circumstances
mitigating his crimes.296 The court ordered the defendant's execution at the
conclusion of the hearing.297
Subsequent to the sentencing hearing, the defendant changed his mind. He
filed a motion for reconsideration of his death sentence and for the assistance of a
court-appointed psychiatrist 9 At the hearing on the motion for reconsideration,
the defendant testified that when he changed his plea to guilty and asked to die, he
had been deeply depressed.29 9 He told the court about his previous drug use and his
state of mind on the day of the shooting.3" His co-perpetrators confirmed his drug
and alcohol use. 30 ' The defendant told the court that his criminal background did
not involve acts of violence.3 2 To support his claimed interest in rehabilitation, the
defendant presented character evidence that supported his claim that he was capable
219 See, e.g., Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Byers,
740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
290 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990).
291 Id. at 1155.
292 Id.
2193 Id. at 1155-56.
294 Id. at 1156.
295 Id.
296 Smith, 914 F.2d at 1156.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 id.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Smith, 914 F.2d at 1156.
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of rehabilitation.3 The defendant explained that "upon his arrest for the shootings
he had been placed in solitary confinement without fresh air, sunlight, or
exercise." ' ° He concluded his testimony by advising the court that he sought
reconsideration of his death sentence because he had been transferred to "better
prison conditions," which made him more optimistic about surviving in prison, and
that "he had been visited by his family who urged him to live." 0 5
After hearing this testimony, the court ordered a psychiatrist to examine the
defendant and prepare a report for the court. 6 Defendant's lawyer objected to the
psychiatrist reporting directly to the court rather than acting as an aid to the
defense.0 7 "Notwithstanding the objection, the psychiatric examination was held
under the direction of the court and reported directly to the court. The examination
was limited to the specific question of mental capacity on the day of the killings."308
The psychiatrist presented his opinion at a later reconsideration hearing. The
psychiatrist's opinion rejected the defendant's theory that his consumption of a
large quantity of drugs, immediately before the crime, affected his mental capacity
and actions.'" Following the psychiatrist's testimony, the defendant petitioned for
the appointment of another psychiatrist.3 0 His petition was denied.3 ' The court
found aggravating circumstances justifying the death penalty and no mitigating
circumstances "sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.""
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the sentence and denied
defendant's petition for a rehearing." 3 The defendant's petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and his petition for post-conviction
relief to the Montana Supreme Court were both denied." 4 His federal habeas
petition was denied by the district court, and he appealed.3"5 On habeas appeal, the
defendant claimed "that his sentencing violated due process because he was denied
expert psychiatric assistance in preparing his claims of mitigating circumstanesv., 316
The Ninth Circuit agreed. 7
The Court of Appeals determined that the defendant had established that his
303 id.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id.
318 Smith, 914 F.2d at 1156.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 id.
313 Id.; State v. Smith, 705 P.2d 1087 (Mont.), reh 'gdenied, 705 P.2d 1110 (Mont. 1985).
314 Smith v. Montana, 474 U.S. 1073 (1986); Smith, 914 F.2d at 1156.
315 Smith, 914 F.2d at 1156.
316 Id.
317 Id.
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mental state was at issue.31 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that Ake required the state,
at a minimum, to "assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense."3"9 Further, the court reasoned that this assistance did
not:
[M]ean the right to place the report of a "neutral" psychiatrist before the
court; rather it means the right to use the services of a psychiatrist in
whatever capacity defense counsel deems appropriate - including to
decide, with the psychiatrist's assistance, not to present to the court
particular claims of mental impairment.32°
The necessity for an independent psychiatric expert was premised on the Seventh
Circuit's determination that a psychiatric expert performed three functions which
may be crucial in cases where mental health is a substantial issue.32'
Because of "the adversarial nature of the fact-finding process and the quasi-
scientific nature of psychiatric opinion," the Ninth Circuit read Ake to specifically
reject the notion of "neutral" psychiatric testimony.322 Indeed, the court cited Ake
for its conclusion that there was no such thing as "neutral" psychiatric testimony:
psychiatry, the court continued, "is not ... an exact science, and psychiatrists
disagree widely." '323
The court determined that Ake's threshold requirement was sufficiently
satisfied. As a result, the indigent defendant had properly requested a court-
appointed psychiatrist to help establish possible mitigating circumstances.324
However, the court held that the trial judge committed error by not only failing to
appoint an independent expert to assist the defendant, but also granting court-
appointed psychiatric assistance only on condition of automatic full disclosure to
8 Id. at 1157.
9 Id. (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985)).
320 Id.
321 Smith, 914 F.2d at 1157. These three factors are:
First, the expert can aid a defendant in determining whether a defense based on
mental condition is warranted .... Second, the expert can coherently present to the
jury his or her observations of the defendant .... Finally, the expert can "assist
in preparing the cross-examination" of psychiatric experts retained by the
government.
Id. (quoting United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 637 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
982 (1989) (emphasis added)).
322 id.
323 Id. (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 81) (omission in original).
324 Id.
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the factfinder.325 The court viewed such automatic full disclosure as impermissibly
compromising the presentation of an effective defense, by depriving the defendant
of 'an adequate opportunity to present [his] claims fairly within the adversary
system.' 326 Moreover, this court-appointed psychiatrist's testimony, the court
determined, was quite important in the decision to discount the defendant's claims
of diminished capacity.3 27 After this initial discussion, the court did not directly
consult Ake to support its independent confidential psychiatrist's theory. Instead,
it relied on other federal opinions.328
The first case cited was United States v. Byers.329 In Byers, the government
was allowed to present the testimony of a court-appointed psychiatrist as rebuttal
evidence to defendant's expert's testimony.133 The defendant argued on appeal that
the prosecutor's presentation of his statements made to a court-appointed
psychiatrist, which negated his insanity defense, violated his right against self-
incrimination.33 ' Because the defendant's expert was available to the government
for cross-examination, the defendant claimed that the government had a fair
opportunity to meet this evidence. Then-Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia rejected
these arguments. Judge Scalia thought the defendant's argument would be
persuasive "if psychiatry were as exact a science as physics. 332 It is, he concluded,
far from that. Judge Scalia emphasized that "[o]rdinarily the only effective rebuttal
of psychiatric opinion testimony is contradictory opinion testimony; and for that
purpose, as we said [elsewhere], '[t]he basic tool of psychiatric study remains the
personal interview, which requires rapport between the interviewer and the
subject.' 333 Hence, Judge Scalia opined that the government's cross-examination
of the defendant's expert was insufficient to adequately challenge this psychiatric
testimony. Byers did not involve Ake or a defendant's right to a psychiatrist. Byers
represents a general notion that a party - any party - requires an in7lependent
psychiatrist to rebut his adversary's psychiatric testimony, because psychiatry is
such an inexact science.334 Byers thus holds, at least under its facts, that where the
requested expert is a psychiatrist, each party is entitled to his own expert.
325 Id. at 1158.
326 Id. at 1159 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 77) (alteration in original).
327 Smith- 914 F.2d at 1158 ("In deciding to impose the death sentence, the Montana
courts relied heavily on the psychiatric report to discount other testimony that [the
defendant's] behavior changed dramatically after he used LSD and alcohol.").
328 Id. at 1159.
329 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
330 Id. at 1107-08.
331 Id. at 1109.
332 Id. at 1114.
333 Id. (quoting Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1964)) (third
alteration in original).
334 id.
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The remaining authorities supporting Smith's independent-confidential
psychiatrist theory are based on the Criminal Justice Act of 1964."' 5 This statute
provides the indigent defendant with a source of rights separate from Ake's due
process approach. Courts interpreting this statute have held that: (1) a trial court's
appointment of several psychiatrists for the state could not constitute adequate
expert assistance for the defense;336 (2) the state's duty pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(e)(1) could not be satisfied with the appointment of a psychiatrist who
ultimately testifies contrary to the defense on the issue of competence;337 and (3) a
psychiatrist who shares "a duty to the accused and a duty to the public interest" is
burdened by "an inescapable conflict of interest.""33 These cases support the
general premise that the essential benefit of having an expert to assist in the
preparation, evaluation, and presentation of his defense is denied to a defendant
when the services of his expert must be shared with the prosecution. Smith uses
these cases to support its theory that Ake requires an independent expert.3 9 Even
without this support, Smith's analysis supporting an independent expert is more
persuasive than Granviel's promotion of a neutral one.340 Accordingly, the fair
weight of the authorities follow Smith's holding that Ake requires an independent
partisan expert for the indigent defendant. 4' Even with the support of this case
authority, the appointment of an independent expert is not guaranteed.
Some courts have held that there is no denial of an indigent's right to an
independent examination underAke if the evaluating center is a separate entity from
the state hospital used by the prosecutor.342 Similarly, no matter how important the
requested assistance, there is no violation of Ake if the indigent fails to satisfy the
required three-step test. 43 For example, a trial court does not deny a defendant due
3 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (2000), which provides:
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or
other services necessary for adequate representation may request them in an ex
parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding,
that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain
them, the court ... shall authorize counsel to obtain the services.
336 United States v. Chavis, 486 F.2d 1290, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
337 United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1985).
338 Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 1970).
"" Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 1990).
340 See supra notes 268-83 and accompanying text.
141 Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995); Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d
333, 340 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066(1992); Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d
640, 645 (11 th Cir. 1991); De Freece v. State, 848 S.W.2d 150, 159-61 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 905 (1993).
342 Westbrook v. Norris, 923 F. Supp. 1129, 1133 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
13 Gardner v. Norris, 949 F. Supp. 1359, 1378 (E.D. Ark. 1996). Seesupra notes 83-84
and accompanying text.
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process by refusing to provide him with a transcript of the pretrial hearing if he fails
to make the required preliminary showing.'" Similarly, there is no Ake violation
even if the indigent claimed he needed the transcript to confront witnesses pursuant
to the Confrontation Clause. 45 Moreover, an indigent who has received funds,
approved by the court, to retain his own expert cannot sustain an Ake violation by
asserting that he needed a more qualified expert.3" Although an indigent defendant
may be entitled to an independent-confidential psychiatrist pursuant to Ake or the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, it is not automatic. In any event, federal courts have
extended Ake beyond psychiatric assistance and found it to include the right to
competent non-psychiatric expert assistance.
IV. EXTENDING AKE TO NON-PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE
A. Non-psychiatric Assistance
Ake reinvigorated an elementary principle: "[WIhen a State brings its judicial
power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps
to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense.""34 This
elementary principle, the Court stated, was grounded in significant part on
fundamental fairness. 4 Therefore, the Court reasoned that justice cannot be equal
where a defendant, because of his poverty, "is denied the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake. 349
Meaningful access or due process is denied to an indigent defendant if the state
proceeds against him "without making certain that he-has access to the raw
materials integral to the building of an effective defense."35 Although the Court
declared that a state need not purchase for the defendant "all the assistance that his
wealthier counterpart might buy," fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants
to the "basic tools" or "'an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within
14 Id. at 1378.
345 Id.
31 Pruett v. Norris, 959 F. Supp. 1066, 1084 (E.D. Ark. 1997), rev'd, 153 F.3d 579 (8th
Cir. 1998); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1012 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding prisoner's claim
that his trial psychiatrists were incompetent in their examination and diagnosis did not raise
an Ake violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights). But see Burger v. Zant,
984 F.2d 1129, 1135 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 5 10 U.S. 847 (1993); supra notes 89-94 and
accompanying text.
34 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985). See supra notes I and 2 and accompanying
text.
348 Ake, 470 U.S. at 76.
349 Id.
350 Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
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the adversary system.' ' 351 "Basic tools" and an "adequate opportunity" are not
limited by definition or language to psychiatric assistance. Ake may fairly be
extended to non-psychiatric assistance. However, cases extending Ake to non-
psychiatric assistance have required a defendant to show "a reasonable probability
that an expert would aid in his defense, and that denial of expert assistance would
result in an unfair trial."" 2
The leading federal case extending Ake to non-psychiatric assistance is Starr
v. Lockhart.353 The defendant Starr was convicted of capital murder and sentenced
to die.354 The defendant's strategy at the guilt phase of his trial was to present
evidence of diminished capacity based on his mental retardation."' At the
sentencing phase, the defendant's strategy was to argue that his diminished mental
capacity and his family background rendered him less morally culpable than a
person of ordinary intelligence with a normal background.356 By this dual strategy
the defendant "hoped to be spared the death penalty. '357
Upon joint motion by the prosecution and defense, the trial court ordered the
defendant "to be examined by doctors at the Arkansas State Mental Hospital to
determine his competency to stand trial, his ability to understand the difference
between right and wrong, and his ability to actaccordingly., 358 The experts at the
State Hospital concluded that the defendant was "mildly retarded," but able to know
right from wrong, able to conform his conduct to the law, and competent to stand
trial. 59 In response to this report and based on his knowledge of the defendant,
defense counsel moved for the appointment of a mental health expert to assist the
defendant in developing evidence of diminished capacity and evidence ofmitigating
circumstances. 6 ° Defendant's lawyer "informed the court that [the defendant] was
given to fits of uncontrollable anger, and that a mental health expert was necessary
to aid counsel not only in developing the evidence of diminished capacity, but also
to enable [the defendant] to assist with his defense., 36' The state opposed the
motion, arguing that, based on the results of the previously performed state
3' Id. (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)).
3 Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1210 (1988); see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n. 1 (1985); Starr v.
Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1288 (8th Cir.) (quoting Little, 835 F.2d at1244), cert denied, 513
U.S. 995 (1994).
133 23 F.3d 1280 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 995 (1994).
314 Id. at 1284.
35 Id. at 1287.
356 Id.
357 id.
... Id. at 1287-88.
319 Starr, 23 F.3d. at 1288.
360 Id.
361 Id.
[Vol. 10:2
AKE v. OKLAHOMA
examination, the defendant had not met his burden of showing his mental condition
reasonably to be at issue. 62 Hence, the state maintained that the court had no duty
to appoint an expert. Moreover, the state contended that the defendant's access to
the court-ordered report, coupled with his ability to question the examiners in court,
provided the defendant with the "basic tools" necessary for an adequate defense.363
Agreeing with the state's arguments, the trial court denied defendant's motion.3"
The trial court relied on a pre-Ake opinion36' to support its finding that the
defendant had not shown his sanity was at issue nor that he was unable to subpoena
the experts from the state hospital which would have satisfied any right he had to
psychiatric assistance.366
The defendant was convicted and sentenced to die.367 He appealed to the
Arkansas Supreme Court which affirmed his conviction and sentence.36
Subsequently, he petitioned the trial court for collateral relief from his conviction
and sentence under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.369 Again, the trial
court denied his petition.7
362 Id.
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 Andrews v. State, 578 S.W.2d 585 (Ark. 1979).
366 Starr, 23 F.3d at 1288.
367 Id. at 1284.
368 Id.; Starrv. State, 759 S.W.2d 535 (Ark. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100 (1989).
369 This rule provides that:
A petitioner in custody under sentence of a circuit court claiming a right to
be released, or to have a new trial, or to have the original sentence modified on the
ground:
(a) that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws
of the United States or this state; or
(b) that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so; or
(c) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by
law; or
(d) that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack; may file a
verified petition in the court which imposed the sentence, praying that the sentence
be vacated or corrected.
(e) The petition will state in concise, nonrepetitive, factually specific
language, the grounds upon which it is based and shall not exceed ten pages in
length. The petition, whether handwritten or typewritten, will be clearly legible,
will not exceed thirty lines per page and fifteen words per line, with lefthand and
righthand margins of at least one and one-half inches and upper and lower margins
of at least two inches. Petitions which are not in compliance with this rule will not
be filed without leave of the court.
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1 (Michie 2001).
370 Starr, 23 F.3d at 1284.
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The defendant then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal district court and requested an evidentiary hearing on four issues.37'
Significant among those four issues was defendant's claim that the trial court
violated his due process rights by denying his request for the appointment of an
expert.372 The majority in Starr, citing Ake, 373 held that it was error for the trial
court to deny the defendant an expert at the guilt phase.3 74 The Starr court read Ake
to hold that due process required that an indigent defendant be provided with access
to a psychiatrist in the evaluation and preparation of his defense.375 Starr coupled
Ake's holding with an en banc Eighth Circuit opinion, which had held that an
indigent defendant must be provided with expert assistance when he shows a
reasonable probability that an expert would aid in his defense. 76 Moreover, Starr
held that the denial of an expert would result in an unfair trial.377 Even so, the court
found the error at the guilt phase not only a "close" one but a harmless error as
well. 7 ' Fortunately for the defendant, Starr held that the denial of expert assistance
to the indigent defendant at the sentencing phase was reversible error.379 in order
to understand how the Starr court distinguished the error at the guilt phase from that
at the penalty phase requires a review of its Ake analysis.
B. The Eighth Circuit's Analysis of Ake - An "Appropriate Examination"
The majority in Starr determined that the "key issue" for the Ake court was the
"inappropriateness" of the psychiatric examination.8 0 As the Starr court saw it,
Ake had been examined for competency to stand trial, "but not for his sanity at the
time of the offense."3 '' Therefore, the court read Ake to hold that "due process
requires access to an expert who will conduct, not just any, but an appropriate
"7 Id. Starr alleged that: (1) his counsel was ineffective for failing to make timely
objections, id.; (2) the trial court erroneously denied his requests for experts to be appointed
to assist him in presenting evidence of diminished capacity, at both the guilt and sentencing
phases of the trial, id. at 1287; (3) the district court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing
on his allegation of an illegal arrest, id. at 1294; and (4) the district court erred in finding his
confession voluntary. Id.
372 Id. at 1287.
171 See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
174 Starr, 23 F.3d at 1287.
375 id.
376 Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1210 (1988).
377 Starr, 23 F.3d at 1288.
378 Id. at 1287, 1292-93.
379 id.
380 Id. at 1289.
381 id.
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examination. 382 Starr read Ake correctly. 3  Ake contemplated a "competent"
psychiatrist who would conduct an "appropriate" examination. 84
C. Assistance in the Evaluation, Preparation, and Presentation of the Defense
The Starr court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the defendant's
ability to subpoena the state examiners and to question them on the stand, coupled
with the court's payment of their travel expenses from the affected city's budget,
sufficed to provide the defendant with the expert assistance to which he was
entitled.38 5 Starr acknowledged that due process did not give the defendants the
right to assistance from their experts of choice.386 However, it did "give appropriate
defendants the right to experts who will 'assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense.'"387 Ake was cited appropriately for the proposition that
it "fundamentally" rejected the notion that a neutral expert could sufficiently satisfy
an indigent's due process need for assistance.3 8 Starr analogized the appointed
expert inAke to an appointment of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.38 9 As such,
the appointment of an expert was to aid the defendant and function as a "basic tool"
in his defense.39 The court argued that "[t]o so function, [experts] must be
382 Id. (emphasis added).
383 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
384 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985):
By organizing a defendant's mental history, examination results and behavior, and
other information, interpreting it in light of their expertise, and then laying out their
investigative and analytic process to the jury, the psychiatrists for each party enable
the jury to make its most accurate determination of the truth on the issue before
them.
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 82:
[W]ithout the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on
issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is
viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a
State's psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues
is extremely high.
Id. (emphasis added).
385 Starr, 23 F.3d at 1290.
386 id.
387 Id. (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 83).
388 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
389 Starr, 23 F.3d at 1291.
190 Id. (citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 77).
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available to 'assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.' 391
In conclusion, the court found that such availability and assistance require more
than permission to subpoena and question an expert on the stand.39  Starr
determined, however, that the erroneous denial of a "basic tool" is subject to
harmless error analysis. 93
D. Harmless Error Analysis and Ake
1. The Basic Rule
Before or at trial, a party who opposes a proponent's offered evidence must
make a timely objection. 94 Failing to raise a timely objection generally violates the
"contemporaneous objection rule" and precludes consideration by an appellate
court. 9 ' The "contemporaneous objection rule" has been described as a "failure to
lodge an objection during the trial [which] constitutes a waiver of any objection on
appeal, absent plain error .... Plain error is an error that 'seriously affect[s] the
391 Id. (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 83).
392 id.
393 Id. at 1291-92.
3' FED. R. EvID. 103(a):
Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected,
and ... [i]n case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the context ....
Id.
39' Butsee, e.g., Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471, 1546 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (holding there
is no contemporaneous objection rule in Arkansas with respect to the duty of the trial court
to properly instruct the jury concerning sentencing in capital cases) (citing Collins v. State,
548 S.W.2d 106,118 (Ark. 1977)), ard, 71 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 963
(1996).
In Collins v. State, 548 S.W.2d 106 (Ark.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977), the
Arkansas Supreme Court pointed out that errors in instructions in such cases would be
recognized on appeal even though a proper instruction was not requested and even if the
"objectionable action which might be reversible error was not argued on appeal in any way."
Id. at 118. Collins does not eliminate the necessity for contemporaneous evidentiary
objections during the guilt determining phase of capital trial. See also Titus v. State, 593
S.W.2d 164, 166 (Ark. 1980).
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fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."' 396 Scholars have
concluded that "it is difficult to determine when plain error occurs."397 Courts have
held, however, that plain error occurs when a trial court "flouts fundamental
concepts of justice basic to our system."398
If the trial judge sustains an objection and excludes the evidence, the
proponent is required to make an appropriate offer of proof.399 Failing to make an
offer of proof, like failing to make a timely objection, may preclude an appellate
court from considering the alleged errors, absent "plain error.' "
Even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, an appellate court may
reverse a conviction, judgment, or jury verdict where it finds an error that
sufficiently prejudiced the party's rights at trial."° A ground for reversal does not
exist without an error. °2 Moreover, the error must produce harm or prejudice to a
litigant's rights at trial or the error will be considered "harmless. '" 4°3 The United
States Supreme Court has determined what kind of prejudice is harmful enough to
require reversal and a new trial.'
In Chapman v. California,4°1 two petitioners were convicted in a California
state court on charges that they robbed, kidnapped, and murdered a bartender.'
One was sentenced to life imprisonment and the other to death." 7 At trial the
prosecutor commented on the petitioners' failure to testify."s Thereafter, the trial
396 United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206, 1212 (6th Cir.) (second alteration in
original), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 926 (1992); see FED. R. EVD. 103(d) ("Nothing in this rule
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not
brought to the attention of the court.").
397 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIELJ. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINALPROCEDURE 1282
(4th ed. 1992).
Virgil v. State, 267 N.W.2d 852, 865 (Wis. 1978) (finding admission of out-of-court
declaration to be plain error where, except for those declarations, the evidence of guilt was
not overwhelming).
399 FED. R. EviD. 103(a)(2) ("Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence,
the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from
the context within which questions were asked.").
41 See supra notes 394-98 and accompanying text.
401 See supra notes 396-98.
402 Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433,445 (1830).
403 See FED. R. CRJM. P. 52(a) ("Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularityor variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").
41 See generally John E. Theuman, Annot., What Constitutes Harmless or Plain Error
Under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure - Supreme Court Cases, 157
A.L.R. Fed. 521 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
401 386 U.S. 18 (1966).
406 Id. at 18-19.
407 Id. at 19.
408 Id.
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court told the jury it could draw adverse inferences from their silence.4 9 The
comment and the instruction violated petitioners' privilege against self-
incrimination.41° Although acknowledging both violations, the California Supreme
Court held the errors harmless.41" ' The United States Supreme Court disagreed.
Justice Black, writing for the majority, held that an improper comment on a
defendant's refusal to testify could be harmless, but it was not in this case.
412
The majority in Chapman concluded "that there may be some constitutional
errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant
that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not
requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction."4 3 In deciding what errors may
be subject to harmless error analysis, Chapman relied on a prior opinion wherein
the court adopted the test: "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. ''414 The
Chapman court then held "that before a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."" 5 The Supreme Court later observed that the inquiry "is not
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have
been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was
surely unattributable to the error."41
6
4 Id.
410 Id. at 20.
41.1 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 19.
412 Id. at 24-26:
[T]he error in these cases was not harmless to petitioners .... [T]he state
prosecutor's argument and the trial judge's instruction to the jury continuously and
repeatedly impressed the jury that from the failure of petitioners to testify, to all
intents and purposes, the inferences from the facts in evidence had to be drawn in
favor of the State - in short, that by their silence petitioners had served as
irrefutable witnesses against themselves. And though the case in which this
occurred presented a reasonably strong "circumstantial web of evidence" against
petitioners, it was also a case in which, absent the constitutionally forbidden
comments, honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty
verdicts. Under these circumstances, it is completely impossible for us to say that
the State has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor's
comments and the trial judge's instruction did not contribute to petitioner's
convictions.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Teale, 404 P.2d 209, 220 (Cal. 1965)).411 Id. at 22.
414 Id. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).
416 Id. at 24.411 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
[Vol. 10:2
AKE V. OKLAHOMA
2. "Structural" and "Trial" Errors
In Arizona v. 'Fulminante,"7 the Supreme Court refined the harmless error
inquiry by identifying two types of constitutional errors - structural and trial.1
Structural errors are considered "defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism,
which defy analysis by 'harmless error' standards.""4 9 On the other hand, "trial
errors" are subject to harmless error analysis.42 Although the Supreme Court in
Ake reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial without
conducting a harmless error analysis,42 Ake errors have been added to the long list
of "trial errors."422 Nevertheless, courts have been reluctant to find Ake errors
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapman standard,423 or to find a
41 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
411 Id. at 307-08.
419 Id. at 309.
420 Id.
421 See Ake, 470 U.S. at 78;'see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text; supra notes
186-88 and accompanying text (discussing Vickers v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 1033, 1037
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
421 See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752-54 (1990) (unconstitutionally
overbroad jury instructions at the sentencing stage of a capital case); Carella v. California,
491 U.S. 263,266 (1989) (jury instruction containing an erroneous conclusive presumption);
Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (admission of evidence at the sentencing stage
of a capital case in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Pope v. Illinois, 481
U.S. 497, 501-04 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of the offense); Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable
presumption); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (erroneous exclusion of
defendant's testimony regarding the circumstances of his confession); Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (restriction on a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness
for bias in violation of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause); Rushen v. Spain, 464
U.S. 114, 117-18 & n.2 (1983) (denial of a defendant's right to be present at trial); United
States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (improper comment on defendant's silence at trial,
in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause); Hopper v. Evans, 456
U.S. 605 (1982) (statute improperly forbidding trial court's giving a jury instructions on a
lesser included offense in a capital case in violation of the Due Process Clause); Kentucky
v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (failure to instruct the jury on the presumption on
innocence); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (admission of identification
evidence in violation of the Sixth Amendment's Counsel Clause); Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. 223,231-32 (1973) (admission of the out-of-court statement of a non-testifying co-
defendant in violation of the Sixth Amendment's Counsel Clause); Milton v. Wainwright,
407 U.S. 371 (1972) (confession obtained in violation ofMassiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970) (admission of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1970) (denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing in violation of the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause).
423 See supra notes 405-416 and accompanying text.
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"substantial and injurious effect" on the jury verdict in habeas petitions.424 Except
for a few isolated cases, courts have been reluctant to find Ake errors harmless.25
3. Ake Violation Not Harmless
In Christy v. Horn,426 a federal district court had to determine whether the state
trial court's failure to appoint a psychiatrist to assist the defendant at the guilt phase
of his capital murder trial violated due process.427 The state supreme court had held
that Ake assistance only applies in very narrow circumstances, specifically where
sanity at the time of the offense is a significant issue at trial. 428 The district court
found that the state court's conclusion that psychiatric assistance would not have
provided the petitioner with a defense under state law was contrary to the evidence
presented at trial. 429 As a result, the district court held that the trial court's failure
to provide psychiatric assistance was not harmless under the circumstances because
the petitioner's mental condition was his only viable defense and his strongest
argument in mitigation for sentencing purposes.43 °
424 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,776 (1946); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619 (1993). The Eighth Circuit, however, and at least two district courts, have
concluded that the Chapman standard for harmless error (beyond a reasonable doubt) applies
in the habeas corpus context, rather than the Brecht standard. See Starrv. Lockhart, 23 F.3d
1280, 1292 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 513 U.S. 995 (1994); Lyons v. Johnson, 912 F. Supp.
679,687-89 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 99 F.3d 499 (2d Cir. 1996); Rickman v. Dutton, 864 F. Supp.
686,712 (M.D. Tenn. 1994), affdsub nom. Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1133 (1998). All other circuits apply Brecht.
4 Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 828-29 (10th Cir.) (finding that where the jury
indicated no doubt about imposing the death penalty and there was no major alteration in the
relative weight of aggravating and mitigating evidence after the jury's verdict, the remaining
aggravating factor was supported by the evidence - any excluded mitigating evidence was
cumulative and therefore harmless), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998); Hassine v.
Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that although prosecutor's
attempt to elicit testimony from defendant about his post-arrest silence violated his due
process rights, this due process violation did not have a "substantial or injurious effect on
the jury's verdict"; this due process violation was not so egregious as to warrant relief
because it did not substantially influence the jury), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1065 (1999);
United States v. Smith, 987 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.) (finding failure to appoint expert pursuant to
federal statute was harmless error), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 875 (1993).
" 28 F. Supp. 2d 307 (W.D. Pa. 1998).
427 Id. at321.
428 id.
429 Id. at 322 ("Contrary to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's finding that [the defendant]
merely had a personality disorder, which is irrelevant when considering an insanity or
diminished capacity defense, the record is replete with multiple diagnoses that support the
conclusion that [the defendant] suffers from severe mental illness.").
430 Id.,
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Similarly, in Castro v. Oklahoma,43 the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether
the trial court denied the defendant due process by not appointing a psychiatrist at
the penalty phase of his capital murder trial." 2 The Castro court held that the trial
court denied the defendant due process,433 thus the error was not harmless.434,
The court rejected the decision of the federal district court that no expert
psychiatrist need be appointed because the state did not offer psychiatric evidence
at the penalty phase.41' This argument, the court noted, had been rejected four years
earlier in Liles v. Saffle.436 Liles specifically held that the state's offering of
psychiatric evidence was not a prerequisite for an indigent's need for expert
assistance during sentencing.4"7 The Ake duty was triggered in Castro by the state's
presentation of evidence of the petitioner's future dangerouiness 38
The trial court had also denied funds to the indigent for an expert because it
determined that the indigent had received the "assistance" of an expert
psychiatrist. 439 Again, the Tenth Circuit disagreed." It found that the previous
expert-psychiatrist had examined the petitioner because he was a friend of the
petitioner's lawyer. 4 ' It was, however, the expert's refusal to testify which made
his assistance inadequate." 2 According to Castro, Ake required an expert who
would testify upon request."'
Castro found three reasons to support its conclusion that the trial court's denial
of the petitioner's request for funds for an expert was not harmless. First, the jury
sent a note to the trial judge during deliberations," 4 indicating that it was not self-
evident to the jury that the petitioner's crime warranted the death penalty."
41 71 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1995).
432 Id. at 1505.
411 Id. at 1515.
41 Id. The court rejected the harmless error standard from Chapman v. California and
instead adopted the Kotteakos/Brecht harmless error standard (did the error have substantial
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict?). See supra note 403 and
accompanying text.
411 Id. at 1514.
436 945 F.2d 333, 340-41 (10th Cir. 1991).
437 Id.
438 Castro, 71 F.3d at 1514.
419 Id. at 1515.
440 Id.
44' Id. The court had a "serious question" whether the expert was competent to provide
relevant expert assistance. This expert's "specialities in child and geriatric psychiatry
probably render[ed] him unqualified to offer an expert opinion on many of the issues raised
in a capital murder trial." Id.
442 Id.
443 Id.
44 Castro, 71 F.3d at 1516 ("The note asked: 'Exactly what is meant by a life sentence?
(We didn't understand 999 years as stated.... "').
445 Id.
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Second, "the State's reliance on the continuing threat aggravating circumstance
directly placed [the petitioner's] mental status at issue." And finally, but "most
importantly," the state appellate court had struck down the "especially heinous,
atrocious, and cruel" aggravating factor," 7 leaving only the "continuing threat"
aggravating factor to be evaluated under harmless error analysis." The court held
that, even under its more demanding harmless error standard, the error was not
harmless." 9 The error "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict.""' Other courts have followed this general trend
of finding Ake errors not harmless.45
4. Starr v. Lockhart and Harmless Error Analysis
Although Ake did not address the issue and its author, Justice Marshall, would
not have applied harmless error to a denial of an expert to an indigent defendant, 42
Starr v. Lockhart453 held that Ake is subject to harmless error analysis. 454 Starr
reasoned that a denial of an Ake expert is more analogous to the situation where
counsel has performed deficiently, than to the situation where the right to counsel
has been denied altogether.455 Like merely deficient performance of counsel, Starr
held that the denial of an Ake expert deprives the defendant of a tool basic to the
preparation of his defense, but that circumstances may render the lack of that tool
a mere inconvenience rather than a total disability.456 Thus, according to Starr,
prejudice may not be assumed.457 With that, Starr held that an Ake error is mere
"trial error, ' 458 and therefore, such an error may result in no prejudice to the
446 Id.
447 Id.
448 Id.
9 See supra note 435 and accompanying text.
450 Castro, 71 F.3d at 1515-16 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946)).
431 See, e.g., De Freece v. State, 848 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Crim. App.) (finding that the fact
that defense counsel was able to cross-examine state witness without psychiatric assistance
did not make the error harmless), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 905 (1993).
452 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
153 23 F.3d 1280 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 995 (1994).
414 Id. at 1291.
... Id.; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance of
counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (deprivation ofassistance of counsel).
456 Starr, 23 F.3d at 1291.
... Id. at 1291-92 ("For example, in Coulter, the lack of a court-appointed expert did not
prejudice the defendant because counsel financed the expert from his own pocket.") (citation
omitted) (citing Coulter v. State, 804 S.W.2d 348, 357 (Ark. 1991)).
458 Id. at 1291.
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defendant.459 If it is truly an "Ake expert," how could it ever be a "mere
inconvenience?" How could a right that was initially compared with the right to
appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment be later reduced in the opinion to the
deficient performance of counsel? How could a "basic tool" necessary to present
an "adequate" defense ever be harmless? Interestingly, Starr equates the violation
of an Ake right with the deficient performance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. However, the seminal authority for the proper measure of an
attorney's performance is reasonableness under the prevailing norms.6 How could
the denial of a "basic" tool necessary to present an "adequate" defense ever be
reasonable? Starr extended Ake to non-psychiatric assistance, but it reduced the
significance of that extension by also applying harmless error analysis to that Ake
violation.
5. Summation of the Federal Approach to Ake
Federal courts agree that Ake entitles an indigent to an exparte proceeding in
order to make a "preliminary showing" of need for an expert."' Some courts agree
that, upon a successful showing of need, a trial court is required to appoint an expert
who will conduct an appropriate examination" 2 and assist in the evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of the defense."3 Moreover, they generally agree that
Ake is not limited to psychiatric assistance. 4 These courts disagree, however, on
whether Ake entitles the indigent to a neutral expert465 or an independent advocate
expert." Ake supports an independent advocate. Ake favors providing the indigent
with a "competent" expert and an appropriate examination in order to allay the
"concern" that the jury have before it the opposing views of the prosecutor's and
defendant's experts.
Generally, federal courts have been reluctant to apply harmless error analysis
to Ake violations." Beyond this recognition, federal courts are split as to whether
an Ake violation results if an indigent's lawyer fails to request the necessary funds
for an expert.6 8 State courts have had to provide their own clarifications on this
459 Id. at 1292.
460 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
461 See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
462 See supra note 192.
463 See supra notes 207 and accompanying text.
464 See supra notes 353-93 and accompanying text.
461 See supra notes 268-346 and accompanying text.
466 See supra notes 290-346 and accompanying text.
467 See supra notes 423-25 and accompanying text.
468 See Wainwright v. Norris, 872 F. Supp. 574, 586-87 (E.D. Ark. 1994), affid in part,
rev'd inpart, 80 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 968 (1996). But see Weeks v.
Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1037 (1lth Cir. 1994) (noting that nothing in defendant's behavior
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and other issues.
V. STATE COURTS INTERPRET AKE
State courts have generally adhered to Ake's command that the indigent
defendant either make a preliminary showing that his sanity was likely to be a
significant factor at trial,469 make a specific showing of need,47 or make both a
showing of need and the presence ofprejudice if the assistance is not provided.4"
In cases holding that a sufficient showing was not made, the defendant has typically
failed to show that his defense theory required the need of an expert.472 A court that
determines that an indigent has a vital need for an expert is more likely to order the
appointment of an expert. Yet state courts have presented a myriad of reasons for
accepting, extending, or rejecting Ake requests.
A. Extending Ake to Non-psychiatric Assistance
would alert defense counsel that an insanity defense was warranted), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1193 (1995).
"' See, e.g., State v. Owens, 807 P.2d 101, 108 (Kan. 1991); State v. Clemons, 946
S.W.2d 206,222 (Mo.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 968 (1997); State v. Pierce, 488 S.E.2d 576,
583 (N.C. 1997).
470 See, e.g., Sonner v. State, 930 P.2d 707 (Nev. 1996), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 886
(1998); State v, Edwards, 868 S.W.2d 682,697-98 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); Davis v. State,
905 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920
(Va. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1154 (1997).
471 See, e.g., People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1187-88 (Ill. 1994); State v. Miskell,
676 So. 2d 1092, 1095 (La. App. 1996); Rogers v. State, 890 P.2d 959, 966 (Okla.), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 919 (1995).
472 See, e.g., Owens, 807 P.2d at 101 (trial court's refusal to order funds for psychiatric
treatment did not deny defendant due process of law where defendant failed to show the
effect of the alleged amnesia upon his mental capacity); Clemons, 946 S.W.2d at 221-22
(defendant did not qualify for funds pursuant to Ake by merely filing a notice of intent to
raise diminished capacity and a notice of mitigating circumstances; bare notices without
more are insufficient to show a trial judge that a defendant's mental condition would be a
significant factor at trial); Sonner, 930 P.2d at 715 (defendant failed to demonstrate a need
for testing beyond that provided by the first three psychiatrists who examined him); Pierce,
488 S.E.2d at 583 (reports submitted by the defendant and his testimony at the ex parte
hearing did not show that his sanity at the time of the offense would be a factor at trial);
Edwards, 868 S.W.2d at 697-98 (defendant who failed to meet minimum threshold showing
of particular need not entitled to appointment of DNA expert); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 659
(defendant's undeveloped assertion that non-psychiatric expert would be beneficial was an
insufficient showing); Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 926 (defendant's assertion that DNA evidence
was "of a highly technical nature" and therefore required an expert to challenge did not
amount to a showing of "particularized need").
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Some courts have extended Ake to non-psychiatric assistance. In Cade v.
State,473 the trial judge refused to appoint a DNA expert for the defendant during the
guilt phase because it determined that the defense counsel had failed to make any
showing of need.474 The Florida Court of Appeals disagreed. It found that the trial
court had abused its discretion because the defense attorney had made a timely
request and the DNA evidence was crucial to the case. 75 Florida courts have been
generally supportive of an indigent's request for non-psychiatric expert assistance.
[n Hoskins v. State,476 the Florida Supreme Court held that a trial judge abused
his discretion during the sentencing phase by denying the defendant's motion for
neurological testing and transportation.477 The trial court abused its discretion
because the court-appointed expert had clearly stated, without refutation, that the
test was needed to properly evaluate the defendant. 7s Other state courts have also
defended an indigent's Ake right.
In Dubose v. State,479 the Alabama Supreme Court held that it was a denial of
due process for a trial court to reject a defendant's request for funds for a non-
psychiatric (DNA) expert. The court found that Ake does not limit the application
of the Ake rule to a psychiatrist, nor had its cases interpreting Ake specifically ruled
that the holding of Ake was limited to cases involving psychiatrists."0 Therefore,
the court held that "the principles enunciated in Ake, and grounded in the due
process guarantee of fundamental fairness, apply in a case of non-psychiatric expert
assistance when an indigent defendant makes a proper showing that the requested
assistance is needed for him to have 'a fair opportunity to present his defense."'"'
... 658 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
414 Id. at 552.
411 Id. at 555.
476 702 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1997).
477 Id. at 209.
478 Id. I
47' 662 So. 2d 1189 (Ala. 1995).
480 Id. at 1192; see also Exparte Sanders, 612 So. 2d 1199 (Ala. 1993) (considering a
defendant who requested a ballistics expert).
411 Dubose, 662 So. 2d at 1194 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985)).
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Other state courts have either specifically held4 2 or implied4 83 that upon a
"proper showing," Ake is not limited to psychiatric assistance. Nevertheless, an
incompetent expert or inappropriate examination has not necessarily resulted in an
Ake violation.
B. Indigent Has No Right to an Expert of His Choice
State courts have not held that Ake gives rise to a federal constitutional right
to the "effective assistance" of a mental health expert, psychiatrist, or a witness.'
It has been held that Ake does not provide a federal constitutional basis for
challenging the competency of the defense psychiatrist used at trial.48 Moreover,
it has been held that Ake does not demand that a defendant's trial attorney be
deemed ineffective because he failed to request an additional psychiatric
examination for the defendant at the sentencing stage. 4 6 A request for an additional
expert is particularly not required when the defendant's mental condition is not an
issue at trial.487
The defendant in Brown v. State488 was convicted of murdering his mother.
The defendant filed a notice of intention to raise the issue of insanity or mental
incompetency under applicable state rules.489 The trial court denied defendant's
motion for funds to obtain an independent psychiatric evaluation.4" However, the
court ordered a state psychiatrist to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of the
defendant.49' The psychiatrist concluded that defendant was competent to stand
482 See, e.g., Thornton v. State, 339 S.E.2d 240, 241 (Ga. 1986) (dental expert); State v.
Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589,592-93 (Iowa 1987) (expert on intoxication); Polk v. State, 612 So.
2d 381 (Miss. 1992) (defendant entitled to DNA expert); State v. Bridges, 385 S.E.2d 337
(N.C. 1989) (fingerprint expert); State v. Moore, 364 S.E.2d 648, 656-57 (N.C. 1988)
(fingerprint identification expert); Washington v. State, 800 P.2d 252, 253-54 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1990) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a forensic
odontologist and a chemist were required as "basic tools" of defense).
483 State v. Gonzales, 892 P.2d 838, 847 (Ariz. 1995) ("[Defendant] failed to make the
necessary threshold showing. [Defendant] did not explain how a fingerprint expert would
be helpful, let alone necessary, to his defense. The state did not offer fingerprint evidence
against him."), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1052 (1996).
484 People v. Samayoa, 938 P.2d 2, 31 (Cal. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1125 (1998).
485 Bloom v. Vasquez, 840 F. Supp. 1362, 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1993), rev'don other grounds
sub nom. Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997).
486 People v. Henderson, 568 N.E.2d 1234, 1275 (Ill. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 882
(1991).
487 Id.
488 391 S.E.2d 108 (Ga. 1990).
489 Id. at 112.
490 Id.
491 Id.
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trial and that he was not suffering from any delusional compulsion, nor was he
otherwise insane.492 Defendant made no showing to rebut the court-appointed
psychiatrist's conclusion.493 On appeal, he claimed that the trial court erred by
denying his request for a clinical psychologist.494 The Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction, holding that he had no right to choose an expert of his
personal liking, nor to receive funds to hire his own expert.495
The Georgia Supreme Court has also rejected claims of due process violations
where the defendant could only identify a possibility of need for the requested
expert.496 Similarly, due process claims have been rejected where the trial court
offered to first have the defendant evaluated by a state hospital to determine if
mental problems existed and the defense refused the offer.497
Other courts have held that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to
the appointment of a psychiatrist of his own choosing at public expense.49  An
indigent defendant is not entitled to the expert of his particular choice, but he is
entitled to a "competent" expert in the field of expertise that has been found
necessary to the defense. Once the court has determined that there is a reasonable
probability that expert assistance would aid in the indigent defendant's defense and
that a denial of such expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial,
the defendant is entitled to an expert, but not a particular one.499
An indigent defendant has no right to shop for an expert to contradict experts
for the state.5°0 But the trial court may consider the indigent defendant's request for
a particular expert. The trial court may choose any competent expert in that
particular field of expertise who would aid the defendant in the evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of his defense. 0' The factors state trial courts have
considered important when choosing an expert deemed necessary to the defendant's
defense include: (1) the number of experts available; (2) what the indigent
defendant expects the expert's testimony to prove at trial or how the defendant
expects the expert's testimony would aid in the defense; (3) the indigent defendant's
choice of expert; and (4) the anticipated costs of such an expert. Relevant
492 Id.
493 Id.
414 Brown, 391 S.E.2d at 112.
495 Id.
496 State v. Grant, 355 S.E.2d 646, 648 (Ga. 1987).
497 See id. at 648.
498 Whisenhant v. State, 482 So. 2d 1225, 1230 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), aff'd in part and
remanded on other grounds, 482 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1983).
499 Exparte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 121 (Ala. 1996).
" See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Ake does, however, appear to require
appointment of an expert with an "opposing" view, at least during the penalty phase.
'01 Moody, 684 So. 2d at 121.
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information has also included when the expert expects payment for his services.0 2
This list is not intended to be exhaustive. A trial court may consider any other
relevant information about an expert when considering whom to choose." 3
Some state courts have held that it is not a denial of due process for a trial
court to decline to appoint an expert who requires payment before trial.' Any
expert who requires payment before trial could be replaced, by the trial court, with
another person of similar expertise. 5 ' A court may consider its prior authorizations
for experts when determining new requests. For instance, where a trial court
authorized funds for the appointment of two psychiatrists to examine the defendant
and then required the experts to render an opinion as to his sanity at the time of the
offense, People v. Wright' held that the defendant was not denied due process by
the post-conviction court's refusal to appoint a third expert."7 Wright concluded
that Ake held that a state was only obligated to provide one competent psychiatrist
and one competent psychiatric examination.08 Wright rejected the defendant's
argument that the only thing which kept him from having a third psychiatric
evaluation was the fact that he was an indigent petitioner.'" The court also
determined that there was no denial of equal protection because the Constitution
does not require a state to provide identical rights to an indigent,. but merely
protects indigents against invidious discrimination among classes of individuals."' 0
Other courts have followed this approach.5 '
C. Ake - Not Extended to Non-Expert Witnesses
In State v. Stewart,"' the Iowa Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing the defendant's request for fifteen non-expert
witnesses at public expense." 3 Although the court noted that the Iowa Code of
Criminal Procedure allowed an indigent defendant to call witnesses at public
expense," the court found that many of the proposed witnesses intended to testify
50 Id. at 122.
503 id.
504 Id.
505 Id.
so6 594 N.E.2d 276 (Ill.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1004 (1992).
307 Id. at 286-87.
101 Id. at 286.
509 Id.
510 Id.
5" See, e.g., State v. Hoopii, 710 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Haw. 1985).
512 445 N.W.2d 418 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).
113 Id. at 420.
514 Id. (quoting IowA R. CaiM. P. 19(4)):
Counsel for a defendant who because of indigency is financially unable to obtain
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to the same matters."' 5 Moreover, the appellate court found that the defendant had
waived his right to object because he had rejected the trial court's offer to allow him
to call these witnesses long distance in order to determine which ones he really
needed."' 6
D. The Qualifications of the Expert
In Binion v. Commonwealth,"1 7 the Kentucky Supreme Court had to determine
whether the defendant, who was convicted of rape and robbery, was unfairly denied
funds for a mental health expert, as well as whether the mental health expert
provided by the trial court was appropriate to meet due process requirements.5
Prior to trial, the defendant notified the court that he would present an insanity
defense." 9 , As a result, the trial court ordered the Kentucky Psychiatric Center to
examine him to determine his competency to stand trial. 2
The expert who conducted the examination was a psychologist, not a
psychiatrist."' The psychologist found the defendant competent to stand trial. The
trial judge, however, ordered another evaluation to determine if the defendant was
competent at the time of the crime.2  If a question existed regarding defendant's
sanity at the time of the crimes, the trial judge indicated that he would grant the
defense motion to provide a mental health consultant."'
The same psychologist examined [the defendant] and found him to be
"borderline mentally retarded and schizophrenic" with "signs of organic
brain damage." The psychologist further found that psychosis "likely did
play a significant role in motivating the rape" but determined that [the
defendant] did not lack substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
expert or other witnesses necessary to an adequate defense of the case may request
in a written application that the necessary witnesses be secured at public expense.
Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry, that the services are necessary and that
the defendant is financially unable to provide compensation, the court shall
authorize counsel to obtain the witnesses on behalf of the defendant. The court
shall determine reasonable compensation and direct payment ....
(emphasis added).
515 Id.
516 Id.
5" 891 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1995).
5 Id. at 384.
I d.
S20 Id.
521 Id.
52 Id.
2 Binion, 891 S.W.2d at 383.
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requirements of the law.524
The psychologist concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial.525
Consequently, the trial judge rejected the defendant's request for an independent
defense mental health consultant.526
Although the Binion court acknowledged that the Kentucky General Assembly
had provided for court-appointed mental health assistance for indigent criminal
defendants by either a psychologist or psychiatrist,527 it found factors in this case
that tended to indicate the necessity for an extensive psychological or psychiatric
examination.52
The trial court's appointment of a "neutral" mental health expert was held
insufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.529 The Binion
court held that "the services of a mental health expert should be provided so as to
permit that expert to conduct an appropriate examination and assist in the
evaluation, preparation and presentation of the defense."53 Citing Ake, the court
held that an indigent defendant is entitled to a psychiatrist"'I - not a psychologist
- "to provide assistance to the accused to help evaluate the strength of his defense,
to offer his own expert diagnosis at trial, and to identify weaknesses in the
prosecution's case by testifying and/or preparing counsel to cross-examine opposing
experts." '532 According to Binion, then, an indigent defendant is entitled to an
independent expert different from the prosecution's expert.
Generally, state courts have held that due process requires that an indigent
defendant must be provided with either psychiatric533 or non-psychiatric534 expert
5 Id. (quoting the psychologist's testimony).
525 Id. at 385. In fact, the psychologist examined the defendant again on the morning
before the trial and determined that he was competent to stand trial. Id.
526 id.
527 Id.; see also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.185 (Michie 1998); id. §§ 504.070, 504.080
(Michie 1999).
528 Binion, 891 S.W.2d at 385:
Here, the report itself, catalogued a variety of mental problems and experiences in
the mental history of the defendant. There is a comment regarding the possibility
of organic brain damage and anti-psychotic drugs had been previously required to
control somatic delusions such as those the defendant was allegedly experiencing
prior to and during the rape and robbery of the store clerk.
529 Id. at 386.
530 Id.
531 Id.
532 Id.
133 See supra notes 469-71 and accompanying text.
531 See supra notes 473-83 and accompanying text.
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assistance upon a preliminary showing of need. And although an indigent is not
entitled to an expert of his choice, he is usually entitled to at least an independent
expert different from the prosecution. State courts have interpreted Ake more
consistently than federal courts. Many states, however, choose to satisfy Ake by
following their own legislative enactments. 5" Again, many of these states comply
with Ake's mandate to provide an indigent defendant with an expert psychiatrist at
state expense.536 Unfortunately, some states fail to comply with Ake or their own
enactments. An analysis of these state statutes is beyond the scope of this piece.
CONCLUSION
In order to receive a fair trial, an indigent defendant is entitled to the basic
131 See AL. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (1995 & Supp. 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.100
(Michie 2000); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-4013(b) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-20-102
(1998); CAL PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
403 (2000); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4603(b) (1997 & Supp. 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-
2605 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.06 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-130.1 (1997
& Supp. 2000); HAW. REV. STAT § 802-7 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 19-852(a)(2) (Michie 1997
& Supp. 2000); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3(d) (1992 & Supp. 2001); IND. CODE § 35-36-
2-2 (1998 & Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE § 813.2 (1994 & Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-4508 (1995 & Supp. 2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.185 (Michie 1998); id. §§
504.070, 504.080 (Michie 1999); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 650 & art. 739 (West
1981 & Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 810 (West 1980 & Supp. 2000); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 5 (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 262, § 29 (West 1992 & Supp.
2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a (West 2000 & Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 611.21 (1987 & Supp. 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (2000); Mo. REV. STAT. §§
552.020.6, 552.030.3 (1987 & Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-202 (1999); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-3931 (1995 &Supp. 2000);NEv.REv. STAT. 7.135 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 604-A:6 (1986 & Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 158A-1 (West 1985 & Supp.
2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-3 (Michie 2001); N.Y. CoUNTY LAW § 722-c (McKinney
1991 & Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450(b) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-
02 (1997 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.024 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 1304(B)(3) (1991 & Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.055(3) (1999
& Supp. 2000); RI. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-8 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-26, 17-3-50
(Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-15-9 (Michie 1995); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (1997 & Supp. 1999); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 26.05
(Vernon 1989 & Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-301 (1999 & Supp. 2001); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5231 (1998 & Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020 (1990 &
Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-13 (Michie 1999); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 814.04,
907.06, 971.16 (West 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-303 (Michie 2001).
536 See, e.g., CAL. PENALCODE § 987.9 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001); MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 768.20a (West 2000 & Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21 (1987 & Supp.
2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-26, 17-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2000); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (1997 & Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5231 (1998 &
Supp. 2000).
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tools necessary to make a defense. Upon a proper showing, an indigent may receive
the assistance of an expert-psychiatrist. According to Ake, this expert must be
competent. That is, he must be "qualified" by skill, education, training or
experience to offer helpful opinions to the judge and jury. Moreover, this
competent-assistant must be an independent-advocate. Federal and state courts that
fail to satisfy these basic tenets strip Ake of its basic value to the indigent defendant.
Similarly, courts which hold that Ake may be satisfied by a neutral expert or one
who is not qualified misread Ake. Moreover, those courts holding that Ake
guarantees only a neutral expert have relied solely on the dictum from a Seventh
Circuit opinion. 7 That opinion does not warrant such adherence.
Several courts do agree, however, that a state's failure to provide a competent
("qualified") expert is a denial of an indigent defendant's due process rights. Even
so, a few of these courts subject these constitutional violations to harmless error
analysis. Fortunately for indigents, many of these courts have been reluctant to find
Ake errors harmless where the defendant's mental condition was his only viable
defense or his strongest argument in mitigation. Because of these varied
interpretations of Ake, defense attorneys must be vigilant at establishing a vital need
for an expert and careful when presenting Ake's minimum requirements. More
importantly, the United States Supreme Court should take the first opportunity to
clarify these issues by reaffirming Ake's basic requirements.
Justice Marshall intended to provide the indigent defendant in a capital case
with a state-funded psychiatrist at the guilt and penalty phases of a trial. Despite
its varied interpretations, ambiguities, and limitations, Ake promises to provide the
vigilant indigent with at least (perhaps more than) what Justice Marshall intended.
Unfortunately, many federal and state courts have misinterpreted Ake. These courts
have mistakenly readAke in a manner that provides the indigent defendant with less
than Ake intended or provided.
... See supra notes 268-88 and accompanying text.
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